Anchor the Black Sea Region to the West

The bloody end to the schoolhouse hostage crisis in North Ossetia, and recent clashes in Georgia between government troops and separatist forces, have put the troubled Black Sea region on the front pages of newspapers once again. This rising violence is also a wake-up call for the West, highlighting the need for a new Euro-Atlantic strategy in a vitally important region that lies at the crossroads of Europe, Eurasia and the Middle East.

Indeed, the Black Sea region is the Euro-Atlantic community's eastern frontier with the wider Middle East. With Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran topping the list of strategic challenges facing the West, anchoring democracy and security in these new borderlands of the Euro-Atlantic community has become imperative for both the United States and the EU. Moreover, success here can provide lessons in how to facilitate the daunting process of reform and modernisation in the wider Middle East.

Georgia's "Rose Revolution" last winter demonstrated that the will to implement radical reform now exists. For the first time, a country in the region is matching its aspirations with the concrete steps needed to become a viable candidate for eventual membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions. A visitor to Georgia's capital, Tbilisi, now sees the same level of determination to join the West that existed a decade ago in the Baltic states.

America and Europe share an interest in the success of these efforts, particularly as they seek to diversify energy supplies away from Saudi Arabian and Persian Gulf oil. The Black Sea is poised to become a key conduit for non-Opec, non-Gulf oil and natural gas flowing into European markets and beyond. The Black Sea region's long-term stability and integration with the West is thus critically important to the long-term energy security strategy of EU and Nato members. Anchoring these countries to the West will not be easy. Whether the end result is better relations or full integration of these countries into the EU and Nato is an open question. But both organisations need to reach out to these countries, a process that should be seen as the next phase in completing the wider Europe.

What should a new bold yet realistic EU and Nato outreach strategy for the Black Sea region look like? Clearly, the region's countries are weaker and further behind previous candidates for Western integration. But the good news is that the EU and Nato are much better positioned to develop an ambitious strategy than they were vis-a-vis Central and Eastern Europe a decade ago. If the EU and Nato decide to launch a bold outreach strategy for the region, they will be able to draw on existing tools, conceptual talent, and practical experience. For example, Nato already has three members – Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey – bordering the Black Sea. As for the EU, the candidacies of Romania and Bulgaria need to be concluded successfully, together with the issue of Turkey's membership aspirations. An EU that includes Sofia and Bucharest, and that is on track with Ankara, will be well positioned to engage the wider region.

The EU also needs to put meat on the bones of its new Neighbourhood Policy, while Nato must apply new mechanisms for strengthening ties with the region. As opposed to a 100- or 200-metre sprint, both organisations need to think more in terms of a much longer race, perhaps a marathon. If countries in the region embrace the idea, a network of current EU and Nato members could step forward with projects and assistance aimed at promoting a Black Sea identity and community.

Recent events in Georgia remind us that resolving the region's "frozen conflicts" – ie, those in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, of Transdneistria in Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan – must be a priority. In reality, these conflicts are not frozen; they are festering wounds that breed corruption and organised crime. They inhibit democratisation and incite instability. While these conflicts involve historical grievances, outside actors – particularly Russia – contribute to their lack of resolution, which is essential for successful reform. So far, neither America nor Europe has made these conflicts a top priority. Resolving these semi-dormant wars requires stepped-up political involvement, economic engagement, and a willingness to provide Western peacekeeping forces and monitors if and when they are needed. But the long-term peace and stability needed to advance economic and political reform in the region will also require either a change in Russian behaviour or a reduction in Russian influence. The experience of the last decade suggests that a policy of engaging the Kremlin intensely while protecting fundamental Western interests may be the best way to proceed.

Developing a new Euro-Atlantic strategy for the Black Sea region must start with the democracies of North America and Europe recognising their moral and political stake in the outcome. Projecting stability and security in these countries is the next logical step in building a Europe "whole and free" and securing the Euro-Atlantic community's eastern frontier with the Middle East. This task will be as important over the next decade as integrating Central and Eastern Europe into the West was in the 1990s.