A Bad Idea Is About to Deploy in Darfur

For the last several years, international efforts to end the war in Darfur have focused on the deployment of a 26,000-man peacekeeping force which Darfurians have come to believe will "save" them. In the words of one of the force's strongest supporters: "Activists have pressed relentlessly for the deployment of a UN-led force to protect civilians in Darfur, and we are almost there."

The truth is that we are nowhere near there - and most probably never will be. With less than a month to go before the force is due to deploy, senior United Nations officials say the best-case scenario is for 6,500 troops to be in Darfur by January 1, 2008, the date of the official transition from the present 7,000-man African Union force to a "hybrid" UN-AU force (UNAMID). Of the 24 helicopters that are needed, not one has been forthcoming. The Sudanese regime is throwing up obstacle after obstacle, as it promised it would. Unless these issues are resolved, Jean-Marie Guehenno, the UN undersecretary general for peacekeeping operations, has warned, "it means the mission in 2008 will not be able to make the difference that the world wants to it to make - and that it may become a failure."

No matter what UN officials say publicly, many in the organization believe that the biggest problem with UNAMID is UNAMID itself. It is, they say, "the world's worst peacekeeping operation" - too big, too top-heavy, too disorganized and with no strategic plan. Just how does the force plan to "protect" almost 2.5 million displaced people, even if, miraculously, it reaches full strength and does not confine itself to base at the first hint of trouble? And what about the millions more who are not displaced but who will be at risk as long as the conflict continues? Will it do so by creating safe zones (in the absence of a peace agreement and functioning cease-fire)? By patrolling roads (in a region the size of Texas)? By escorting humanitarian workers (who don't want their neutrality compromised by armed escorts)?

Just how does UNAMID plan to neutralize tens of thousands of Janjaweed, rebels and bandits in a region that is transitioning from genocidal fury to anarchy and chaos?

Crucially, how can the hybrid force safeguard camps whose security is threatened not only by the Janjaweed, but by internal tribal wars, rampant criminality and the presence of arms galore? UNAMID can patrol the perimeters of camps, but does not have powers of arrest and detention and cannot provide security within the camps. Many believe it could not stop the government if it decided to break up the camps.

Those directly concerned with the $2-billion-a-year force are not the only ones worried. Many relief workers in

Darfur have major concerns about the potential impact of UNAMID on humanitarian action in Darfur. There are already signs of a brain drain from humanitarian organizations to UNAMID and its UN-size inducements. Any blurring of boundaries between peacekeeping and humanitarian action risks putting humanitarians at greater risk than they already are.

And then there is the environmental factor, with UNAMID compounding the problems of a humanitarian-driven construction boom that has already had major environmental effects. The demands on natural resources of one international peacekeeper are many times that of a single Darfurian. It is estimated that each peacekeeper will use 40 times more water than a Sudanese, for example. There will inevitably be greatly increased demand for precious construction materials - timber and bricks. And so on.

"No one thinks UNAMID is a good idea," says one of those who attended a recent brainstorming session in Khartoum. "They are all going into it knowing it is going to be a nightmare," says another. "They are playing up to public opinion. It is absolutely disgraceful."

It is, of course, pressure from rights groups and activists, especially in the United States, that made UNAMID the centerpiece of international policy on Darfur. Often run by ill-informed religious groups, "Save Darfur" campaigns kept the region on the agenda at a time when many just wanted it to disappear. But the unchanging narrative of "genocide" and "slaughter," the inflation of death tolls, and the reduction of a complex conflict to a simple morality tale created mass hysteria which limited the ability of decision-makers to pursue legitimate policy options and craft solutions relevant to the facts on the ground.

And so, in December 2007, the international community is implementing a plan that almost everyone involved in it or affected by it acknowledges is the wrong plan at the wrong time. It would have made more sense in 2003-2004, at the height of the conflict. It is not the solution in 2008.

"I am sure the hybrid UN-AU mission in Darfur has enabled all those watching the Darfur tragedy helplessly all these years to claim a victory of sorts," says Timur Goksel, a 24-year veteran of UN peacekeeping in South Lebanon. "But will it work? I am afraid it won't. The UN is hardly capable of running its own complex peacekeeping operations.

How it will ever manage an operation that is to be effectively commanded by an inexperienced, under-resourced and relatively new regional organization that has more than a few teething problems is beyond comprehension."

A senior Western officer in Sudan agrees: "The best we can probably hope for is that UNAMID will be no worse than [the African Union force]. But it is going to happen, and we have to try to make it work."

So, for those who love bullet points, here are three for this already benighted peacekeeping operation, whose failure is being forecast even before it hits the ground: First, give priority to deploying the civil affairs officers who will be a small but absolutely vital component of the force. One savvy civil affairs officer focused on community peacekeeping, conflict prevention and intelligence-gathering is worth a battalion.

Second, give priority to confidence-building - especially with Arab groups, who are still shamefully neglected by international and humanitarian workers. The few NGOs that have reached out to Darfur's Arabs have found that they have relatively safe access to parts of Darfur that other NGOs have been unable to reach.

And third, be prepared for a sharp change in the popular mood when Darfurians realize that it will be many, many months, at best, before UNAMID can begin, perhaps, to make a change to their lives. Inflated expectations suggest that the honeymoon will be short.