China Maneuvers to Bring a Soft-landing to the Korean Crisis

As the standoff between Washington and Pyongyang continues, there is growing impatience - within the Bush administration and among some major American media - not with North Korea, but with China and its perceived inability or unwillingness to pressure its North Korean "comrade." Shortly after President Bush publicly vented his irritation with Beijing by telling the world that he reminded President Jiang Zemin about his commitment to resolve the North Korean crisis, the Pentagon dispatched the 97,000-ton aircraft carrier Carl Vinson to the Pacific. Not many, however, have noticed the quiet build up of frustration in China vis-à-vis North Korea or noted China's unusual military exercise on its frozen northern plains. Beijing may not say it in public, but it is no less frustrated and worried about North Korea than Washington, and like the US it does not have an abundance of good options.

Like President Bush, China too has all its limited options on the table. This was signaled by an unusual military exercise held without much fanfare. In mid-January - less than a month after North Korea withdrew from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - the People's Liberation Army (PLA) threw itself into unusually early large-scale military exercises. Across the frozen plains of the north, in the deep seas to the east, and up in the sky, various branches of the PLA performed drills involving complex scenarios and sub-zero temperatures. In the past decade or so, the PLA has usually not conducted drills until after Chinese New Year, and has normally focused its training in areas of the Taiwan Strait. The emphasis on cold weather for both the ground and naval forces indicates heightened concerns about the ongoing crisis in the Korean Peninsula. In the winter of 1950-51, the 9th Army Group (150,000 strong) on the eastern front suffered severe frostbite, which disabled 22% of its forces and some 1,000 dead. This time, the PLA seems determined to avoid unnecessary attrition should such an intervention become imperative.

The PLA's preparation for subzero environments, however, does not suggest that China has frozen its strategic calculus regarding the current crisis and its likely outcome. Diplomacy always remains as the first and most important option. But China is painfully aware of the limits of diplomacy and especially that of its ability to pressure North Korea. Contrary to the expectations in Washington, China's limited options place it in a severe dilemma.

On one hand, a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) with nuclear weapons is not only a destabilizing factor, but also a dangerous and unpredictable neighbor. China could in the future also become the target of nuclear blackmail. On the other hand, China's limited influence on the DPRK is restricted to the economic arena, and the DPRK already made it clear that any economic sanctions would lead to war. Although this was directed at the US, it also implies other that other nations would face similar danger. Finally, Pyongyang made clear that it intends only to talk to Washington and others should get out of its way.

The lessons of the Korean War, if any, suggest that China should never get into something not started by itself, and that China should intervene only if there is a reasonable chance of success. Historical legacies, however, should be treated with caution. The current crisis in the Korean Peninsula is seen as more dangerous because of the added nuclear factor. China's national interests today are far more tied up with the stability of the peninsula. In the past few decades, China has become a profoundly conservative nation in Northeast Asia. It became the largest export market for both South Korea and Taiwan in 2002, a year after it joined the WTO. The same year also saw China become the largest direct foreign investment recipient country in the world, receiving some $50 billion and surpassing the US for the first time in history. Even a limited conflict in the region may have grave consequences for a much globalized Chinese economy. The crisis could also lead to a considerably nuclearized Northeast Asia where Japan, South Korea and even Taiwan are all nuclear capable. In other words, doing nothing is perhaps also dangerous in this fluid region where major powers interact, engage, retreat, and come back only to face another round of geopolitical tug-of-war.

These considerations, among others, have led to a new round of debate among Chinese foreign and defense analysts. One of the emerging schools of thoughts is arguing for a proactive posture regarding the ongoing, fast-changing crisis.

Shi Yinghong, a prominent analyst in Beijing, argues that China's strategic environment has been fundamentally altered as a result of the Korean nuclear crisis. Perhaps Shi's analysis is most significant because for the first time, a People's Republic of China (PRC) analyst is publicly blaming the DPRK for starting the ball rolling and creating a situation in which China could soon face an even bigger threat to its security. As to the current standoff, Shi believes that the "extreme rhetoric" and "near extreme behavior" of the DPRK are the major obstacles for a peaceful resolution. The US is also to blame for its refusal to have a dialogue and to provide security guarantees for the DPRK. Shi argues strongly that China's primary strategic interest is to exert maximum influence on the DPRK and to coordinate with utmost effort with the US, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan and Russia in order to "shield" the DPRK from weapons of mass destruction. To what extent Shi's proactive posture is shared by other policy analysts remains to be seen, although his views were recently published on the official People's Daily website.

Beijing's current reluctance to get involved in the crisis may be explained by the consequences of the Korean War. For Beijing, the three-year war, which ended fifty years ago, still haunts China's foreign and defense policy makers. Although the PLA fought the war into a stalemate with the most powerful military in the world, Beijing paid a tremendous price economically, diplomatically and strategically, including sowing the seeds of the future Sino-Soviet friction. On the other hand, the war also tested the limits of China's cooperation with both Russia and the DPRK, and its antagonism with the US and South Korea.

The US attempt to "outsource" the resolution of the current Korean nuclear crisis to China, however, misses the roots of the problem (failure by both Washington and Pyongyang to abide by the 1994 Framework). It also indicates that the US is out of touch with a profoundly changed Northeast Asia where the lines between the Cold War friends and foes have significantly blurred in the past few decades. Although Beijing sided with the DPRK during the three-year bloody war (1950-53), China is not in a position to dictate to the DPRK even on less sensitive, non-security policies, let alone able to switch on and off the Korean crisis, as some of the Bush officials claimed.

Throughout the three-year conflict, China bore the brunt of the fighting and suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties. The post-war DPRK official propaganda, however, scarcely acknowledged China's role. The fact that the Chinese military completely withdrew from the DPRK in 1958 indicated the strain between the two communist countries. Over the following thirty years, whenever Moscow and Beijing were locked in a fierce intra-bloc conflict, the DPRK maximized its interests by playing Beijing against Moscow and vice versa.

China's pragmatism in both domestic and foreign policies during the reform decades (1979-now) has further strained ties with Pyongyang, for at least two reasons. One is China's pursuit of "normalized" relations with both the South and North. While diplomatic ties with Seoul have meant more trade and investment from the ROK, Beijing has also gradually ended its "friendly" pricing practice with the DPRK.

The second reason for strained Sino-DPRK ties is that China has conducted its relations with the DPRK within a broader regional environment of peace and stability conducive to China's economic development. As a result, Beijing has gradually assumed a more balanced posture in its policies toward the two Koreas and made it public that it opposes any instability arising from either side of the Demilitarized Zone.

As a result of these developments, China has largely been drawn into the world's trading system while the DPRK finds itself in not-so-splendid isolation. By the time Kim Il-song passed away in 1994, Sino-DPRK ties were considerably weakened, if not lost. Occasional high-level visits did occur, but the trust between the two sides, essential for any alliance, was gone. If anything, the younger Kim has systematically purged his regime of anyone with strong Chinese links. For Beijing, managing relations with the "dear leader" has been a tricky business.

Unlike his father, who was educated in Manchuria, spoke Chinese, and joined the Chinese Communist Party, the younger Kim was born in Russia and seemed obsessed with that country's vast landscape of 11 time zones prior to his current challenge to the world's strongest power. In July 2002, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov visited Pyongyang. This was followed by Kim-Putin summit in Vladivostok on August 23. By this time, the younger Kim had had three summit meetings with Russian President Putin, including Kim's two visits to Russia within a year and the first ever visit by a Russian president to the DPRK (July 2000).

Prior to the current crisis, while Russian-DPRK ties were warming up, relations between Beijing and Pyongyang were cooling down considerably. One souring point was the issue of North Korean refugees in China. Beijing blamed certain groups and the media in Japan and South Korea for 'stirring up' the refugee issue. Chinese officials also blamed North Korea for failing to prevent its own people from coming to China. Meanwhile, Beijing was also irritated by Kim's decision to set up a special economic zone at Sihuiju across the Yalu River and then selecting a Chinese private businessman, Yang Bin, as its director. Yang was arrested shortly afterward for tax evasion.

For Beijing, the standoff may not lead to a simple replay of the 1994 Korean nuclear crisis, which ended with a diplomatic solution. Although both sides still seem to be leaving the door open for dialogue, this crisis is more reminiscent of the 1950s. Before the outbreak of the 1950 Korean War, the US first underestimated the DPRK by casting the Korean Peninsula outside the US defense perimeter, and then plunged in headfirst in September 1950. Now the Bush administration may be repeating the same mistake. After switching off the dialogue pursued by Clinton and Kim Dae Jung, Washington's only remaining options may be economic and military pressure.

China does not want the diplomatic windows to close. But despite China's obvious reluctance to moving the issue of North Korea's nuclear non-compliance to the Security Council and risking a confrontation, a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency is scheduled for February 12. The coming days will severely test the diplomatic skills of China and its Security Council partners in keeping the crisis from blowing into a second Korean War or worse.