China Remains Wary of the US-Led World Order

WASHINGTON: China's economic transformation in the post-Mao era has been truly remarkable. However, in foreign affairs Beijing has placed more of a premium on traditional realpolitik calculus than embracing "new thinking." Despite signs that China accepts the prevailing world order - including US primacy - there are signs that it remains cautious and tentative, ready to shift its position and possibly reverse course if circumstances change.

In moving away from autarkic economic policies and suspicions of interdependence, Chinese leaders have come to terms with many features of the post cold war order including US military supremacy which could work to support Chinese development needs. For instance, allowing the US to continue protecting sea lines has made real economic sense, as China is increasingly dependent on energy imports from the Middle East and Persian Gulf. (See Michael Yahuda's excellent analysis).

Such Chinese cooperation with the prevailing world order, however, is only half the story. The other half remains conditional and contingent when considering important security and political issues.¹ It is not difficult to understand why.

The end of the Cold War improved China's security situation, as the USSR was removed as a meaningful threat. And yet the other superpower - the US - stayed around. Indeed, US-led Western condemnation of the Tiananmen crackdown, rising Chinese nationalism, and perceived US support for Taiwan independence headed the list of reasons why Beijing came to see the United States as the new "hegemon." American power and influence in Asian and world affairs seemed aimed at pressuring, intimidating, and holding back China's rise in Asia. Deng Xiaoping advised Chinese leaders to try to avoid confrontation, to "bide time," working to take advantage of existing international opportunities. By moving slowly, he believed, China could build up its "comprehensive national power" and secure a more advantageous world leadership position. Today, Chinese leaders continue to reaffirm commitment to Deng's maxims.

China also sees obstacles to its rise not only in the US, but also in US allies and international organizations where the United States plays a leadership role, like NATO and the World Trade Organization. US opposition and attempts at "containment" have been clearly evident to Chinese leaders in the clusters of security, economic, political and other differences that have arisen. Chinese grievances have been particularly focused on US resolve to continue support for Taiwan, to remain the leading power in Asian and world affairs, and to promote change in China's political system.

Although it happens largely out of public sight, there are frequent encounters of US and Chinese military forces along China's periphery. From time to time, these encounters can lead to significant conflicts, such as the April 1, 2001 EP-3 spyplane incident. Even as the two powers endeavored to resume normal ties after that unfortunate collision, in 2002 an unarmed US Navy surveillance ship was harassed and rammed by Chinese boats in waters off the Chinese coast. A repeat of the miscalculation in close quarters seen during the EP-3 episode could certainly lead to casualties and consequences that could challenge the prevailing moderation in China's foreign approach. But Chinese distrust of the US is not simply an incident-based phenomenon.

Beijing's wariness of the US is grounded in long-standing suspicions of the United States on the part of Chinese elites, even Chinese academic and government specialists on US affairs. These are reinforced by a national education system and media network that have conditioned broader Chinese opinion to think of China as a long suffering target of depredations and pressures from outside powers, with the United States as the leading oppressor in the recent period. Following the Tiananmen crackdown and the collapse of international communism, Chinese leaders gave greater salience to such nationalistic conditioning, contributing to the sharp deterioration of Chinese popular views of the United States after the Cold War. ²

The George W. Bush administration has done a better job than many previous American governments in using its position of overall strength. It has employed a mixture of incentives and disincentives in persuading Chinese leaders to pursue cooperative and moderate policies toward the United States and its allies. US-China relations are better today than at any time since the Tiananmen incident and the end of the cold war, despite American policies on issues like support for Taiwan, missile defense, security relations with Japan, NATO expansion, sanctions on Chinese weapons proliferation actions, and other measures long sensitive to China. Nevertheless, recent disclosures of the private deliberations of senior Chinese leaders show strong continued wariness of the United States. Chinese President Hu Jintao said:

"[The United States has] strengthened its military deployments in the Asia-Pacific region, strengthened the US-Japan military alliance, strengthened strategic cooperation with India, improved relations with Vietnam, inveigled Pakistan, established a pro-American government in Afghanistan, increased arms sales to Taiwan, and so on. They have extended outposts and placed pressure points on us from the east, south, and west. This makes a great change in our geopolitical environment." ³

China's carefully calibrated and generally cooperative approach to Asian and world affairs, combined with its restraint in the face of new departures in the Bush administration's policy, argue for a continuation of such policy. At the same time, limits on Chinese moderation and flexibility are evident. China was widely seen in the United States as continuing to straddle the fence on Iraq, privately pledging not to block US military action but siding publicly with France and others in calling for protracted inspections. Beijing's advances in criticizing and working to resolve the crisis over North Korea's nuclear program fell short of US expectations in seeking more concrete pressure on the North. For their part, Chinese officials say they would be willing to trade cooperation on Iraq and North Korea for US support on the Taiwan issue. Deep US-China divisions are seen in the continuing clash of long term security interests in the region - particularly the continued PLA buildup targeted at Taiwan and US military preparations to deal with Taiwan contingencies. They suggest that a major breakthrough toward strategic cooperation is unlikely. ⁴

Indeed, if the Bush administration were to become bogged down in the war on terrorism, Iraq, or elsewhere, and/or it were to lose its approval at home and support abroad on account of a major US economic downturn, Beijing's policy could change. Chinese leaders might feel tempted to revive pressure tactics of the past in order to reverse recent advances in US policy in areas sensitive to Beijing, notably Taiwan. Not to seek gains over Taiwan at times of US weakness or dependency on China would go against many decades of Chinese practice in dealing with the United States over this issue. US-China common ground over Korea also remains shaky. ⁴ A more forceful US stance on North Korea would alarm China, which very likely would take strong measures to block the US pressure.

Third parties, notably the leaders in Taiwan or North Korea, have the ability to take provocative action that could quickly shift China's current calculus in favor of a more confrontational approach toward the United States and others in Asian and world affairs. China also would be alarmed by major breakthroughs in US defense relations with Japan and would view with concern stepped up US involvement with other states around China's periphery because of the war on terrorism or other reasons. For the foreseeable future, though, Deng Xiaoping's advice on "biding time" and lying low will likely remain the watch word for Chinese foreign policy.

1 David Michael Lampton, The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001, p. 1-36.

2 Rosalie Chen, "China Perceives America," Journal of Contemporary China, 12/35, 239-264.

3 Andrew Nathan and Bruce Gilley, China's New Rulers: The Secret Files. New York: New York Review Book, 2002. p. 207-209.

4 Robert Sutter, "China's Rise in Asia," PACNET 11A March 7, 2003.

5 David Shambaugh, "China and the Korean peninsula, Washington Quarterly, spring 2003, p. 43-56.