A Chinese Lesson for the US: How to Charm South-east Asia

THE spate of summits in South-east Asia this month - the annual meeting in Bali of Asean leaders and their regional dialogue partners, the Apec heads of state convention in Bangkok, accompanied by United States President George W. Bush's and Chinese President Hu Jintao's visits to individual countries - has highlighted the intensified interest in the region on the part of the US and China.

However, while the Chinese leaders have approached South-east Asia like prosperous and benign businessmen touring a marketplace, the American President has come through more akin to a general surveying the battlefield.

China's signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation at the Asean summit was an important gesture of its acceptance of the South-east Asian institution's norms and values. This was bolstered by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's 'charm offensive' in Bali, which indicated that Beijing was keen to foster 'super friendly' ties with its southern neighbours.

These actions indicated the consolidation of China's approach to South-east Asia, which is focused primarily upon economic cooperation and mutual gains. Beijing's priority is to build up and strengthen trade and interdependence between China and the region.

The host of agreements signed this month ranged from further commitments towards a free trade agreement, more people-to-people exchanges, a special exposition in China for South-east Asian businesses and four important trade agreements with Australia.

Chinese foreign policy now employs more aggressively its key asset - China's burgeoning and potential economic strength.

Beijing is trying to reassure South-east Asians and, increasingly, Australians, that they can have an important stake in China's continued economic growth and development.

If China manages to convince its neighbours that Chinese economic growth is good for them too and increase the degree of interdependence between them, then the costs to a potential challenger to Chinese interests are raised significantly. In this sense, it is trying to bind the region by giving it a strong stake in ensuring China's future development.

Moreover, to dispel the 'myth' of the 'China threat', Beijing needs to demonstrate its desire to behave as a responsible and benign regional power.

China's other neighbouring regions are relatively inhospitable - Central Asia is now subject to competitive strategic US and Russian intrusions; and South Asia is complicated by ambivalent Sino-Indian relations and sub-continental politics.

In contrast, South-east Asia is the most profitable region for Beijing to demonstrate its international goodwill because here, states are more realistically reconciled to China's inevitable dominance and to living with it.

REGIONAL LEADERSHIP

IN ADDITION, the post-9/11 respite China received from adverse US scrutiny has provided room for Beijing to pay more attention to cultivating its stature as a regional leader.

When Mr Hu assured the Australians that China would conduct serious business with the country in spite of its status as the US' 'sheriff' in the region, he was conveying a message to the US regarding both China's intention to play a constructive role in the region and to work with the US' regional leadership.

At the same time, however, it could not have escaped Chinese leaders' minds that regional divisions vis-a-vis perceived current US unilateralism may play to China's advantage, as some countries evince a preference for developing better working relations with China as a hedge against American arrogance and other problems in relations with the US.

Mr Bush's unprecedented visits to Manila, Bangkok, Singapore and Bali, in association with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (Apec) summit, were designed first to demonstrate a high regard for its friends and allies from the region in the wars on terrorism and Iraq; and second, to press home Washington's expectations of continued or increased support from them.

To the Philippines, the closest US ally in South-east Asia, Mr Bush promised the delivery of previously agreed military aid and equipment to fight terrorists, and used his visit to help boost President Gloria Arroyo's standing in advance of upcoming elections.

Thailand - in which Hambali, one of the leaders of the regional terrorist network Jemaah Islamiah, was apprehended and which is sending 800 combat engineers to Iraq - walked away with 'major non-Nato ally' status.

In Singapore, where the Government has openly supported both the wars against terrorism and Iraq, and with which Washington had signed a free trade agreement recently, Mr Bush received the pledge of transport equipment and military personnel for Iraq.

In Bali, Mr Bush met a cautious President Megawati Sukarnoputri (who stressed both differences and common interests with the US), was enlightened by moderate Muslim leaders, and took the opportunity to make some conciliatory remarks about Islam.

The Bush trip to South-east Asia was mainly symbolic. Like Chinese diplomacy in the region in recent weeks, Mr Bush wanted to send messages of common interest and mutual benefit in cooperation.

In contrast to the Chinese, the Americans treated this string of visits more like a wartime tour of the battlefield: the President was, at the same time, more gung-ho about the progress of the war (or wars), but also more nervous about general security conditions.

It is telling of the times that an American president, on a visit to this region, can find but two cities considered safe enough for him to spend the night, avoids the capital in favour of a Hindu island resort in the midst of the most populous Muslim nation in the world, and is forced to cut short an eight-hour visit to what is ostensibly its closest ally in the region because of unfavourable public reception.

Unlike the Chinese too, the Americans seem less sensitive to the critical need to reassure this region about its understanding of South-east Asia's concerns and constraints, its appreciation of common interests and its seriousness in working towards common goals and mutual benefit.

In some ways, this is understandable - the US is a global hegemon, and South-east Asian states have explicitly and publicly acknowledged this fact of life.

On the other hand, as some regional governments come under more pressure to throw in their lot with the US, domestic political constraints - in the form of religious, ethnic and nationalistic pressures particularly on democratic governments - will operate more strongly, increasing the price of being a friend of the US.

MORE GOODWILL, PLEASE

INSTEAD of giving the impression that it takes for granted regional support and cooperation, Washington may want to work more obviously at building up a store of goodwill, much as what China is doing now.

It can begin by restoring American interest in South-east Asia over and beyond the issue of terrorism, especially in the area of broader trade ties with the region at large, which have declined since 1997 and after 9/11.

This will help significantly in reassuring South-east Asians that Washington sees the region as something more than just the 'second front' in the 'war on terror', that it is not so consumed by terrorism that it has lost focus on other areas of mutual interest which are of greater benefit to the region.

As China understands, the economic imperative is dominant in the region, and South-east Asian states want to be respected and treated as partners by the major powers.

Ultimately, South-east Asia does want the US to remain closely involved in the region, and it has tried to bind the US into regional institutions and security arrangements.

However, the success of these attempts in the post-9/11 context would depend upon a recognition in Washington that this region has an attraction that goes beyond bases, access rights and terrorist networks.