Countering Terror with an Amnesty: Why It Makes Sense

SAUDI Arabia has been accused of harbouring jihadist terrorists ever since 15 of the 19 persons involved in the 9/11 attacks on America were found to be Saudis, and the leader of the Al-Qaeda network was identified as Saudi-born Osama bin Laden.

The Saudi government initially ignored the existence of Al-Qaeda networks in the kingdom, and deemed any attacks there as unthinkable. But when targets in the Saudi kingdom came under terrorist attack in May last year, Riyadh rulers were forced to admit not only that the terrorists were present but also that its very legitimacy as custodian of the two holy mosques was under threat.

Saudi authorities embarked on an intensive manhunt, promising rewards for the capture of 26 militants wanted for terrorist acts. The sums offered ranged from US$270,000 (S$460,620) to US$2 million.

The Saudi offer provoked Al-Qaeda to step up its charge that the Americans were pushing the Saudis to fight terrorism and that the government was cooperating with the crusaders against good Muslims. Al-Qaeda stepped up its campaign against the Saudi government, which it accused of being non-Muslim.

Al-Qaeda continued recruiting and canvassing support from Saudis through websites and forums, spreading information on weapons use, tactics of kidnapping and attacking, for all to follow. It also aimed to spur an exodus of oil industry experts from the country so as to cripple the economy and undermine the Saudi regime.

Al-Qaeda then issued calls to foreigners to leave the kingdom while attacking foreign residential compounds and businesses in Khobar and Yanbu in May this year. Twenty-eight persons were killed in the attacks.

Saudi authorities scored some successes in counter-attacking terrorist groups. However, in a surprise move on June 23 this year, Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah announced an amnesty for Saudi Al-Qaeda members involved in terrorist acts in the kingdom. The amnesty period was for one month and offered individuals the chance to return to the Islamic fold and engage in soul-searching. Those who spurned it would be struck with the full force of the kingdom.

While sceptics tried to discredit this Saudi way of fighting terrorism, the Saudi government claimed it was successful. One month after the amnesty period ended, Prince Abdullah declared security in Saudi Arabia very strong and the hold of terrorism over. Only mopping up operations were left.

AMNESTY CRUCIAL IN ISLAM

THE Saudi initiative needs to be considered in the context of Islamic teaching. The concept and practice of amnesty is a crucial component of Islam. Muslims are encouraged to forgive their enemies. Indeed, they are rewarded for such behaviour.

The current amnesty has many precedents. Each year, during Ramadan and the Prophet's birthday celebration, Muslim leaders grant amnesty to many individuals convicted of different crimes. Historically, amnesty has always symbolised the power, saga- city and honour of the ruler.

Al-Qaeda has long accused the Saudi regime of being not Islamic since it did not implement the syariah law and cooperated with the infidels in fighting the mujahideen for the sake of the United States. The rise in the number of Saudi Al-Qaeda members, sympathisers and collaborators has supported such accusations. The amnesty was an opportunity for the regime to counter those accusations.

The speech announcing the amnesty included a chapter from the Quran where the act of amnesty is highlighted. The intended message was to demonstrate that the kingdom is ruled by God's law. Those who sought amnesty would be secured and treated in accordance with syariah law, the source of justice in the kingdom. The objective of the amnesty was to demonstrate the kingdom's power and decisiveness in fighting terrorism.

BIG PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT

THE approach taken by the Saudi government had a big psychological effect not only on the militants, but also on Saudi society and the international Muslim community. It highlighted that while Al-Qaeda is threatening the Saudi regime and carrying out attacks against both Saudi and foreign citizens, the regime, on the other hand, was giving amnesty to the perpetrators.

For example, when Osman Hadi Al-Maqboul Al-Omary, one of the 26 on the wanted list, gave himself up on June 28 this year, he was released and allowed to go free. On top of that, a member of the Saudi royal family ordered that he be given US$45,000 to settle his debts, another US$10,000 as allowance for the family, and salaries of US$500 and US$800 respectively for him and his children.

Clearly, the regime is using all resources at its disposal to defeat Al-Qaeda members. Families of the wanted individuals have been sending advice to their relatives through the local media, asking them to surrender and return. The main message in this process was to show that the wanted individuals were still welcomed in society and loved by their families, as long as they gave up fighting the government.

In addition, religious leaders have participated in spreading and explaining the government's initiative on different occasions. Friday sermons were used as opportunities for religious leaders to talk and advise citizens about what they have to do according to the syariah law. Indeed, some of them, such as Sheik Safar Al-Hawali, were facilitating negotiations and communication between the government and the militants.

Since Al-Qaeda has used fatwas to justify its view and behaviours, the government did not hesitate to use the same medium. The Saudi Mufti-General issued a fatwa calling on 'Citizens and residents to inform about each and every one who plans or prepares for committing destructive actions so as to protect the people and the country'.

After July 23, the date for the end of the amnesty, the following results were noted: 12 persons from the list of the 26 names were still on the run; another 12 had been killed and two had surrendered. Thirty wanted persons not included in the list have surrendered in the kingdom, while another 27 have surrendered in other countries.

Some Saudi scholars have requested an extension of the amnesty period, but the government has rejected this and suggested instead the registration of the names of those willing to negotiate their surrender. The names would be included regardless of the time needed to conclude the negotiation.

Sheik Safar Al-Hawali, who is communicating with the wanted persons, said 'it takes time to convince them', and added that 15 to 20 persons were willing to surrender.

Analysts believe the amnesty has served well those with secondary roles in Al-Qaeda, such as carrying out logistical duties and providing accommodation and food to Al-Qaeda's militants. However, it would be very difficult for those involved directly in preparing or carrying out operations that killed civilians to accept the amnesty as they have to be convicted according to the Islamic law. Therefore, ideological and political leaders among the wanted men are unlikely to surrender, and neither are the military commanders.

The Saudi initiative provides a new approach in fighting terrorism. It has successfully engaged the Saudi society in such a campaign. Contrary to what one may expect, the regime did not suffer any damage to its sovereignty or legitimacy; instead, it has come across as a true Islamic regime. This type of imaging is very much needed today where many innocent people are killed and many areas in the world have the potential for bloody confrontations.

On Aug 7 this year, interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi offered a similar amnesty to persuade Iraqi militants to stop their violence. It recognised the effectiveness of the Saudi experience and offered another alternative to military methods.

Although some see the Saudi amnesty as an unnecessary move because it benefited only the local regime rather than stopping the violence or getting all Saudi Al-Qaeda members to surrender, it is instructive to note that the way terror has been fought for the last three years has resulted in impressive military operations but which have had limited political or social effect.

Today, more than ever, voices are increasingly calling upon Muslims to put their own houses in order. Yet those quarters need to bear in mind that, in order to carry out this responsibility, Muslims need to be trusted, respected and credited. Their traditions, histories, and ways of doing things form an essential part of this process. Seen from this perspective, the Saudi amnesty should be understood for what it is: an attempt on the part of the Saudi government to muster and use all of its strong social and political resources to fight the scourge of terrorism.