How Washington Can be a Hyper-Power and a Hyper-Borrower

What kind of a superpower gets into so much debt that it has trouble pushing around countries that it would love to? The American kind, says Philip Segal, Markets and Finance Editor of the Asian Wall Street Journal. China and Japan - two major buyers of US government bonds - could do great damage to the American economy if they decided to stop buying or to suddenly sell their share of the US debt. America's love of Italian marble, Chinese-made toys, and reliable Toyotas requires Washington to constantly run current account deficit. If foreign investors were to dump US bonds, Segal explains, Washington would be forced to raise interest rates, which in turn would slow investment and spending in the US. But although the US is potentially vulnerable to this sort of manipulation by foreign countries, Segal says, countries that rely on the US market to sell their products - like China does - would be shooting themselves in the foot if they did anything to slow consumer spending in the US. As long as US consumers keep searching for an ever-more comfortable lifestyle - and as long as security interests don't clash too greatly - it seems Washington and its foreign funders will be content to maintain the 'borrow and spend' cycle of investments and exports that undergirds much of the current world economy. - YaleGlobal

How Washington Can be a Hyper-Power and a Hyper-Borrower

Foreign buyers of US bonds are banking on a stable US consumer market
Philip Segal
Tuesday, September 2, 2003
Playing footsie: China supplies most of America's footwear and lends Uncle Sam tens of billions of dollars.

NEW HAVEN: The United States has emerged as the planet's only superpower and the world's largest debtor nation. Many of the countries that are funding the US debt don't like a lot of what Washington does, but it is unlikely that they would pull the credit rug from under the feet of Uncle Sam. The reason: in an unstable world, they need a strong America - and its vast market.

With a stock market bubble behind it and a housing bubble that could pop anytime, the last thing the US needs are sharply higher interest rates. That's exactly the punishment China and Japan are in position to administer, if they ever decide to start dumping their vast storehouses of US government debt, which would force the US to raise interest rates.

But chances are that they won't. Japan is a strategic ally and is less of a worry because it has no fundamental strategic differences with the US. America also has no reason to fear that to push China on the critical issue of getting North Korea to behave itself would lead Beijing to crash the US government bond market.

According to the International Monetary Fund, China's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2002 was worth $1.2 trillion, less than 4 percent of the world's total output. Add Japan, and the two were responsible for 16 percent of world GDP. Yet by mid-year this year, China and Japan alone had some $900 billion in foreign exchange reserves, or about a third of the world's total. Much of those reserves were tied up in US government debt, as well as the debt of quasi-government housing financiers Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Substantial sales would have thrown US finance into crisis, hence Asia's considerable leverage over America.

Here's how America got itself into this: as the US imports far more in goods and services than it exports, it needs someone to step in a lend it the money to keep spending on imported cars, Italian marble for monster houses, and lots of the stuff you see on the shelves at SEARS or Wal-Mart. As it turns out, two of the biggest bankers for the world's uni-polar superpower are a couple of middle military powers, Japan and China. Given their huge trade and payment surpluses with the US, their currencies should have risen sharply against the dollar this year. Instead, Japan's yen has appreciated only slightly, and the Chinese yuan has remained rock steady, given its formal fixing to the dollar. With all the dollars they earn, China and Japan have bought US Treasury debt in huge amounts, becoming bankers to the world's biggest military power. By this summer, holdings by the Federal Reserve of paper on behalf of foreign governments have soared from some $600 billion in July of last year to $750 billion. Asia is mostly responsible for that increase.

Washington would love it if Asian countries let their currencies strengthen against the dollar (by buying fewer Treasury bonds, but not dumping the bonds in one great heap). A weaker dollar would make it easier for the US to export things to Asia, and would also take some of the pressure off the poor euro. With Japan and China refusing to let their currencies rise much against the dollar, anyone who doesn't like the dollar's prospects piles into the euro, which explains that currency's smart rise of late. Too strong a euro would bring on recession in Europe, and nobody really wants that.

There's also a security implication to the China-US financial relationship. Washington's relatively soft approach on North Korea - a member of the "Axis of Evil"- is often attributed to Pyongyang's nuclear weapons capability. But there's another reason, too. China is the one country that can really hold Kim Jong Il's feet to the fire, but it doesn't always rush to Washington's aid on this score. International Strategy and Investment, a Washington-based newsletter, cast North Korea's role in the Beijing-Washington calculations this way: "The US has leverage because China needs our markets, and China has leverage because the US needs China's dollar support."

That's true, but fortunately for the US, China's need is greater. With some of the world's sickest banks and rapidly rising unemployment, the last thing China would want to do is cause a world-wide recession, hitting its main export market especially hard.

Follow the money. China grows only by export-oriented investment. It actually loses money when it lends to the US, because US bonds pay lower interest than China receives when it lends on the international bond market. But that's a small price to pay. China's leadership is petrified of a stronger currency and the negative effect that could have on foreign investment, not to mention the social unrest that could follow.

China seems like an economic powerhouse sometimes, but remember: a full 50 percent of China's exports in 2001 came from foreign-invested enterprises, according to the OECD. That's up from a figure of just 17 percent ten years earlier. While foreign-invested companies ran a trade deficit of $18 billion in 1994, that's now turned around to a trade surplus, bringing China a net $7.3 billion surplus in 2001. Take away foreign investment in China, and Beijing has a gigantic problem. For all the money they bring in, foreign companies employ just 1.5 percent of the total workforce. China's Maoist loss-making state industries still employ 38 percent of volatile urban workers, according to OECD figures. Those workers (who are no different from workers elsewhere in that they're prone to unrest when they can't earn money), need more foreign-funded jobs, not fewer.

None of this means the US can go on holding the most financially irresponsible party it's ever put on. In the words of Fred Bergsten, of the Institute for International Economics, "to finance both the current account deficit and our own sizable capital exports, the United States must import about $1 trillion of foreign capital every year, or more than $4 billion every working day. The situation is clearly unsustainable."

Still, the leveling off won't happen after a sudden abandonment by Asia of the US capital markets and a plunge in the dollar. China will eventually strengthen its fixed currency from 8.3 to the dollar to somewhere around 6 to the dollar and life will go on. In the meantime, the US can push Beijing as hard as it can to help on North Korea. There will be little real pushing back.

Philip Segal is Markets and Finance Editor of the Asian Wall Street Journal and currently a Knight fellow at the Yale Law School.

© 2003 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization