Iraq War: Big Tasks and Narrow Window

London: Editor Nayan Chanda sat down with the director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, John Chipman, for an interview on March 14. The following are excerpts from the interview:

Nayan Chanda: Is the threat of a French veto against the US, the first since the Suez crisis, directly related to a post-cold war imbalance?

John Chipman: It is the result of the French psychologically placing themselves in the position of a balancer to the US. One word that the French government has shared since the 1990s with the Russians and the Chinese governments has been the word 'multipolar'. While the French, the Russians, and the Chinese sometimes agree in the desirability to create a multipolar world, the French are not necessarily attached to the pursuit of multilateralism. They have acted unilaterally frequently in international politics, including in times when their own military force was in play. What they are interested in is grasping the holy grail of a multipolar world where America's unipolar strength is somehow contained by a group of other countries acting in prudent opposition to the United States. One place where France has a disproportionate power is the UN, where it has the right of veto. I am convinced that psychologically it is moved to threaten and potentially use this veto as a way of containing the United States and playing a balance of power role with respect to the US.

Nayan Chanda: How do you see the impact of the threat of French veto of a second UN resolution?

John Chipman: The initial impact of the threat of French veto at the UN was hugely frustrating. It poisoned France's relations with at least two of the permanent members of the UN Security Council because France was a key author of Resolution 1441. France extended the negotiations over 1441 by seven weeks and was aware of every comma and colon in the resolution - having inserted most of the final grammatical emendations in order to secure the results it wanted. The most important element of the resolution was where it stated that it was the final opportunity for Iraq to immediately undertake disarming. The words 'final' and 'immediate' were the words with which the French were wholly comfortable. Yet they then began to argue for an extension of time and additional opportunities, which was, in a sense, a clear breach of the universal consensus that helped to establish the resolution 1441. The British and the American view was that the French were in effect acting in bad faith by their not being willing to follow through the serious consequences that were contemplated in the resolution. The French threat to veto any second resolution was a threat wholly inconsistent with their initial position on the renewed process and the resolution 1441. This misunderstanding between the US and France, to put it mildly, has made it much more difficult for the UN to be given an important role in the post-war reconstruction of Iraq, and for its considerable skills in managing, administration, and dealing with humanitarian issues.

Nayan Chanda: Are you saying there won't be any UN role after the end of the war?

John Chipman: That will still be the aspiration of the United Kingdom - that a resolution be passed, that even in the first few days after hostilities have begun there will be a context in which the UN might reenter the economic, diplomatic and administrative process in a post-war Iraq. But the experience that the UN has had has made it more difficult for those in the State Department who argue in favor of a so-called three-phase preference of a short military administration, UN sponsored interim authority, followed by an Iraqi government. And it strengthens those in the Pentagon who believe in a two-phase structure: one with a longer military governorship, leading immediately - without an UN interlude - to an Iraqi government. Many believe that the three-phase process is one that would give greater assurances of a smooth process.

Nayan Chanda: What would be the role of the military government?

John Chipman: The fact of the matter is that the military government will have to be US-led, because they will be the power in the country when any other type of power structure will have been upset or destroyed. A military governorship is presentationally the most uncomfortable but in a practical sense the only realistic immediate result of the war. The first task of the military administration will be disarming Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. It will be extraordinary if there is a regime change that does not achieve disarmament. It will be in charge of developing some elements of economic life in Iraq, dealing with some of the immediate humanitarian concerns, ensuring food and medicine and the like are distributed widely and properly. It will have at some point to supervise a de-Baathification process by which people who were at the very top of the ruling Baath party with very important responsibilities are assured not to have any role in the government of the country. It won't be a full de-Baathification, as the country is full of Baathist party members. I have heard a number of high hundreds to two thousands.

Nayan Chanda: Who is likely to be the military governor?

John Chipman:While Gen Tommy Franks will be fully in charge of the military operations and the Combatant Commander for the Central Command, it is likely that his deputy, Lt. Gen. John Abizaid, who speaks Arabic, has a graduate degree in international relations and was the sophisticated director of the joint chiefs until January 23 is likely to take over that role and bring to it the political savvy of a scholar-general who understands the politics of the region.

Nayan Chanda: Once the US has taken control of Iraq, what would be its main tasks?

John Chipman: Clearly the security of Iraq and developing a political process would be an immediate one. I think the Europeans and others will expect the US to return with special vigor to the Middle East peace process. Many feel that an implied promise has been given that the road to Jerusalem goes through Baghdad. Once the US is in Baghdad there will be increased and vociferous calls for the US, diplomatically so to speak, to go to Jerusalem and exercise a degree of unilateral pressure there too, in order to create the outcome that the President advertised for the region when he announced on June 24 (2001) that a two-states solution was the only credible one for the region. Palestinians have moved a little bit by creating the position of prime minister for Abu Mazen [popular name for Mahmoud Abbas] - perhaps not the ideal prime minister, not going into a new generation, someone closely involved with the PLO and Fatah but also someone closely involved with the Oslo accord. Many Europeans would expect the President to speak firmly about a halt to settlements to bring Sharon to the negotiating table. The big question is about the window of opportunity. Assuming even a very fast war, one would have only five or six months before autumn of 2003 to begin this process. By the autumn of 2003 one begins getting into the American electoral calendar. This compromises any American leader from taking risks on the Israeli front. Equally, for that to happen in that time frame, it would be necessary for the President to take a hugely pro-active and personal role where he is willing to put the prestige and element of his presidency on the line. And his advertised inclination has been to do anything but that. Since he associates with Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton - people from rather different political background - that kind of intense presidential involvement. Only if he is convinced by really close friends that intense diplomacy is going to be to the net advantage of his presidency will he undertake it. Only if he undertakes it will there be a reinvigorated peace process.