Lessons of Failed States: Rebuilding Sierra Leone and Liberia

SANNIQUELLIE, Liberia: The chain of events prompted by that terrible day in September 2001 has begun to blur, and the electorates in the US and Britain are eager to end their countries’ involvement in wars that ensued. Yet the Afghan conflict, in particular, is far from over, and both governments are having to redefine their missions to counter arguments for an early wind-down of military operations.

The debate, being driven almost exclusively by increased casualty figures, runs the risk of forgetting a key lesson of 9/11: that failed states anywhere in the world can play host to malignant forces with a global reach. In the heat of the argument, precious lessons learned from interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and more recently in Liberia and Sierra Leone are also being ignored.

Both Barack Obama and Britain’s Gordon Brown face a challenge in which voters’ unease is being pitted against the reality of what is needed on the ground in a faraway land, a syndrome that most memorably drove decisions over Vietnam almost half a century ago. Exacerbating this situation is the inability of Western democracies to agree on how to deal with this major international conundrum of our times – the non-functioning or rogue regime.

The September 11 attacks that prompted the Afghan intervention came not from the Taliban-run Afghan government, but from Osama Bin Laden who was given sanctuary there. A major effort is now underway to prevent Pakistan – where Al Qaeda leaders now hide – from becoming the next failed state domino. But such sanctuary could equally be given in Somalia, North Korea, Burma and a dozen other places, with the increased fear of terrorists acquiring a ‘dirty bomb’ with nuclear material.

Over the past eight years, therefore, the primary need to turn around a failing state has moved from being one with a humanitarian goal to one of security. The mission itself, however, remains the same: To raise the standards of living to such a degree that people can see a better future in building rather than destroying their society.

The solution lies in long-haul commitment.

In the early nineties, missions into Somalia and Rwanda ended in failure – one with a rapid US withdrawal; the other with genocide. The European-led intervention into Bosnia faltered. But when the US took the lead in 1995 and persevered, a lasting peace was forged. Similarly, the Kosovo mission in 1999 has been successful.

Significantly, the people of Bosnia and Kosovo accepted that the highest government authority should lie with an outsider rather than one of their own. Almost fifteen years after the guns fell silent, power in Bosnia is held by an internationally-appointed High Representative. For nearly ten years, Kosovo was run by the United Nations; even after its 2008 declaration of independence, much authority still lies with the European Union. The willingness of the parties in conflict to cede sovereignty to international forces for a period and patience and perseverance of intervening powers may be essential to success.

For examples of missions still in progress, one can look at West Africa where interventions in Sierra Leone in 2000 and neighboring Liberia in 2003 have stopped wars, but have yet to secure enough confidence for a lasting peace. Given the ethnic and religious mixes, the poverty, corruption, collapse of institutions and infrastructure and a tendency toward warlordism and violence, these two countries present us with important tests in dealing with the failed state – and all it implies for the security and welfare of their citizens and that of the wider world.

Most Liberians and Sierra Leoneans bought into the interventions and stopped fighting. As in Bosnia and Kosovo, Liberians accepted infringement of their sovereignty – albeit to a lesser extent. The Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP), initiated by Liberia and international institutions, gave foreign technocrats budgetary control of government ministries. The aim was to ensure that corruption did not hamper rebuilding.

GEMAP was not implemented in Sierra Leone which, arguably, is facing more problems in its transition from emergency conflict-prevention to long-term nation-building. Corruption continues to strip main hospitals of essential medicines. Roads to the eastern area where the civil war began are virtually impassable. Young men, who used to be child soldiers, have no jobs.

In Liberia, most hospital pharmacies are well stocked. Lawyers and administrators in remote places have trained at some of the best Western universities. Officials have canvassed at the grass roots to determine exactly what the people want.

“We went all around the county into the villages and down to the clans,” explained Nimba county superintendent Mohan Kromah at a meeting in the county capital Sanniquellie. “We asked them: ‘What is it you need?’ And they came out with three priorities – roads, education and health.”

By patching together the lessons of these interventions, we may be able to establish some guidelines on how to deal with failed states.

There has been far too little debate on the success of the Bosnian and Kosovo models because of fears of accusations over sovereignty infringement and colonialism. Yet these arguments ignore the fact that sovereignty belongs not to the political elite but to a nation’s people.

Liberia’s GEMAP program and its initiative with grass-roots communities is an example of how to re-establish sovereignty. This system also builds democracy from the grass roots and tests local accountability.

The West should be cautious in using elections as benchmarks of their own. None other than the former US ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, has warned that the current Afghan elections could further destabilize the country and worsen ethnic divisions.

So far he has not been proved wrong. As the election got underway, voting was marred by widespread and deadly Taliban attacks, serious fraud and patchy turnout. The winner will have almost certainly have to secure his power by cutting deals with local warlords, possibly with narcotics dealers and those involved in organized crime.

And shortly before polling day, the government brought in a law that by international standards blatantly violated the rights of women: A husband is now allowed to starve his wife if she refuses to have sex with him. It is seen as an attempt by President Hamid Karzai to bolster his political support among hardliners.

These are the malignant side-effects of the democratic process. Elections might give a government international legitimacy and provide a smoke screen for the political elite. But they do not necessarily deliver more freedoms or improve life for the poor.

Too often the opposite is the case.

What is really needed in these failed states is good governance and the stamina to build institutions. They include a free and responsible press; uncorrupt and efficient public services; an independent judiciary that resolves cases and makes decisions; a disciplined police and military; a strong election commission; a banking authority; and education, health, transport and other authorities – all of which must be held to account.

Yet this takes decades.

Less than a year after the end of the Second World War, the West began drawing up the sophisticated policy of containment that eventually defeated global communism. Eight years after September 11, there is not yet a similar concept in dealing with the threat from failed states – even though it is these societies that have been the driving force of American foreign policy and its current wars.