Looking After Number One

In recent weeks, the Iranian government has found itself confronting a serious political dilemma: how to help build a stable Iraq without giving the impression that it is cooperating with its arch enemy, the United States. The path ahead is filled with minefields and critics are preparing to make their assault, regardless, it seems, of the direction Iran takes.

For Iran, Iraq -- unlike Afghanistan -- has special meaning. Iraq is not simply Iran's neighbour. It is the country where the holy sites of Najaf, Karbala, and Kadhemiya, among others, are located. It is at these sites that the Prophet Mohamed's son- in-law, Imam Ali, his sons and grandsons are buried, and where religious schools have flourished and spiritual leaders have studied for centuries. Over many centuries, millions of faithful Iranians have sought emotional and spiritual comfort and personal salvation in their pilgrimage to holy places in Iraq.

At this moment, however, Iran's options in dealing with the Iraqi situation are limited and not without attendant risks. Iran's leaders -- reformists and conservatives alike -- are deeply conscious of, and troubled by, the slogan still reverberating throughout Washington's corridors of power: "Next Stop, Iran".

Preventing American action in this regard is Iran's top strategic priority. Given the two states' close religious ties and shared colonial experience, the Iranian elite enthusiastically supports direct popular elections in Iraq. They hope that free elections in Iraq will bring to power a friendly government that is not interested in plotting against post-revolutionary Iran.

Iranian leaders are suspicious of the US occupation authority's strong alliance with Kurdish leaders Massod Al-Barazani and Jalal Al-Talabani, various Interim Governing Council (IGC) members including Mwafaq Al-Rebaie, the head of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) Abdul-Aziz Al-Hakim and with Ayatollah Sadrul-Deen Qabanchi.

The two most troubling alliances, as far as the Iranians are concerned, are those forged by Al-Talabani and Al-Barazani with the neoconservatives in Washington. The Kurdish leaders are separatists and have a vested interest in the development of a weak central government leading, eventually, to a fragmented Iraq. The possibility of such a scenario taking root on the ground alarms Iranian leaders.

While Al-Rebaie, Al-Hakim and Ayatollah Qabanchi have strong support in Iran, Tehran appears to increasingly view their alliances with the separatist Kurdish leaders and the occupation authorities as threatening to its strategic interests in Iraq. Having spent many years in exile, Tehran adjudges, these figures lack true political weight within Iraq.

Thus, the understanding in Iran is that Al- Rebaie, Al-Hakim and Ayatollah Qabanchi are opportunists and that their political goals may harm Iranian long-term interests. Specifically, Iranian leaders believe that these individuals intend to weaken other Shia groups with substantial popular support, to the detriment of stability and sovereignty in Iraq, in order to raise their own profile.

Astonishingly enough, it must also be acknowledged that some in the Iranian conservative elite perceive "controlled unrest" in Iraq coupled with direct confrontation with Muqtada Al-Sadr's movement as attractive options. This is because such "controlled unrest" keeps US policy makers occupied and fully distracted from action against Iran.

Unfortunately, the Pentagon's strategy of militarily confronting Al-Sadr strengthens the argument of those who support a continued, overt animosity towards the US. The attraction of a continued confrontation with Al-Sadr, for the Iranian conservative elite, stems from two factors often overlooked by policymakers in Washington.

The first revolves around the nature of Al-Sadr's movement. Unlike other religious movements in Iraq -- such as the SCIRI and the Al-Dawa Party headed by Ibrahim Al-Jafari -- Al-Sadr and his supporters have never sought refuge in Iran. They lived through former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's era in Iraq, and their roots are firmly in Iraq.

After the chaos and looting that took place in several Iraqi cities immediately after the collapse of Hussein's regime, the Al-Sadr movement stepped in to maintain law and order while vehemently denouncing the destruction of private and public property. This show of organisational discipline, and a willingness to help the poor, strengthened the popularity of the Al-Sadr movement among alienated and disenfranchised segments of the Iraqi society.

Set within the context of the traditional struggle for power in Najaf between the Al- Sadr and Al-Hakim families, the young Al- Sadr's growing popularity has alarmed Iraqi religious and secular organisations that have, for three decades, resided outside Iraq. Like Al-Hakim, Iran prefers tested allies over Al-Sadr, so the Tehran regime feels it is preferable that the US seek to politically marginalise the controversial movement. This sentiment is also echoed by minority Kurdish groups.

Finally, the Iranian elite hopes that the more forceful the occupation authorities' suppression of the Al-Sadr movement is, the more it will alienate the populace. It is more than likely that this suppression will not only radicalise the Al-Sadr movement but will also further inflame the entire population. Thus, it may ultimately make the American mission in Iraq more dangerous and its colonial objectives more difficult to secure.

The second factor has far-reaching political implications. Following the execution of his uncle in 1980 and of his father and brothers in 1999 by Hussein's regime, the Al-Sadr family's 31-year-old head did not receive the full religious training by prominent scholars that his lineage would have suggested appropriate. As a consequence he is inherently more political and secular than his religious competitors. Nevertheless, he capitalises on his prestigious lineage, and on the nostalgia, network of charities and mosques left by his father, Grand Ayatollah Mohamed Sadiq Al-Sadr, to assertively voice his concerns about the current crisis and its consequences for the future of Iraq.

While publicly denouncing the Pentagon for advocating the arrest or assassination of Al-Sadr, the Iranian conservative elite exploits US action against him to further inflame Iraqi public resentment towards the US and accuse its leaders of committing a political blunder.

Indeed, both in Iran and Iraq there has been a growing reference to the US as the modern incarnation of Yazid, the tyrant ruler who ordered the killing of Prophet Mohamed's grandson, Imam Hussein. In the psyche and collective memory of many people in Iraq and Iran, Yazid represents tyranny, illegitimacy and evil. Since Imam Hussein is the great-grandfather of Muqtada Al-Sadr, any attack on the latter by the US- led occupation authorities -- especially if they were to carry out their threats to assassinate him -- would provide Iran with a golden opportunity to make a connection between the US and Yazid. Such an act would further blacken America's already tarnished image in the region.

Iranian leaders understand that American mistakes in Iraq have been numerous and grievous. Iranians also painfully feel the harm that has been done to the Iraqis. While the leadership may welcome such mistakes tactically, they understand that strategically the US poses a grave threat to Iranian national interests.