Merging the Word with the Sword

It was a crude move when a man identifying himself as Osama bin Laden advised the Europeans last week to distance themselves from the U.S. occupation of Iraq and to gain a respite from death-spreading terrorists as a result. But it certainly hit a sore spot and showed that al-Qaida terrorists see Europe as a political unit with which they can play strategic games.

The first concrete sign of this emerged in December, when a handbook titled “Iraq in the Jihad - Hopes and Risks“ appeared on the Internet. The book - which in hindsight reads like a terrorist prophesy - develops a kind of terrorist domino theory: Terrorists should first hit Spain because public opposition to the Iraq war is strongest there, it said. Spain's government would not be able to withstand more than two or three terrorist attacks before withdrawing its troops from Iraq - or else it would be voted out of office. The authors recommended that Poland or Italy should be next on the hit list. Some terrorists seem to be very much aware of the unwillingness of many residents of the Western Hemisphere to feel like a unity in defense of a greater common good.

Just before he was elected last month, Spain's new prime minister, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, called the fight against terrorism an urgent task - but Zapatero also said his government aimed to fight with mostly non-military means, an implicit critique of the government that was in office at the time. Zapatero's statement also reflected the well-known argument that the use of military force does not actually fight terrorism, only fuels it. That argument is not all too far removed from the claim that the West itself is actually to blame for becoming the target of terrorists.

In Germany, some politicians are also working to stand apart from the United States. "We have nothing to do with those Americans" - that appears to be the message of the Social Democratic Party's European election campaign. The party's top candidate for the European Parliament, Martin Schulz, said his party would exploit Germans' concerns over the foreign policy course of U.S. President George W. Bush. This is understandable. After all, the same method proved to be successful in 2002, when Chancellor Gerhard Schröder used it as a key campaign plank. One can hardly expect a party conducting a political campaign - which also has little else to offer - to forgo such an opportunity.

And yet it also reflects Germany's (and probably Europe's) distorted self-perception. Over several decades, the Europeans saw themselves in a coalition of interests and values with the United States. Now they are emphasizing small differences, which, if need be, can turn into a big difference. This would be legitimate if Europe's desire to decouple itself from the United States was based on political strength and a convincing concept for a common European foreign policy. But Europe has a long way to go to get there.

The United States has not brought peace or perspective to Iraq since its invasion last year. But this isn't because it is a Rambo-type power that is incapable of anything but reckless destruction. It is above all the result of a - non-excusable - naivete: The warring power believed, as so often, that the end of a dictatorship would automatically mark the birth of freedom and democracy. It entered postwar reality badly prepared and badly advised.

But this does not justify what some vaguely call the European crisis resolution model. For Europe has always been the small, dependent child of the United States: It could rely on words and diplomacy only because the big brother carried the sword. What is more, efforts to resolve conflicts through dialogue nourished those forces that now are using the United Nations as a forum for anti-Western propaganda and have turned it into a useless power in crisis resolution.

The real question is how words and swords have to work together in a crisis situation. Words alone will not help get the job done.