Moscow Hostage Crisis Repercussions Felt Across Caucasus and Central Asia

The hostage crisis in Moscow has prompted neighboring countries to individually convene in security councils addressing the same issue of counterterrorism. Domestic decisions will have potential to determine the stability of cross national relations. While Azerbaijan has immediately closed its Chechen cultural center in an attempt to reduce tensions with Russia, for example, Georgia’s reluctance to extradite suspected Chechen terrorists upon Russian request has raised issues between the two governments. Such alarm is not isolated to this incident: the possibility of resumed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has effectively placed Christian Armenian leaders on guard against a possible Muslim Chechen-Azerbaijan alliance. Further east, in Central Asia, the experience of terrorists crossing borders shows that the resolution of conflict depends on the interplay of national and regional strategies. - YaleGlobal

Moscow Hostage Crisis Repercussions Felt Across Caucasus and Central Asia

Thursday, October 31, 2002

The repercussions of the Moscow hostage crisis are being felt across the Caucasus and Central Asia. Officials in both regions say the Moscow drama highlights a need for increased vigilance and fresh security measures to combat terrorism and Islamic radicalism in their own countries. At the same time, some regional observers are growing increasingly concerned about new, emerging security threats.

In general, governments in the Caucasus and Central Asia have lauded Russian President Vladimir Putin’s handling of the hostage drama, in which special forces used a potent opiate in an operation to subdue approximately 50 Chechen captors. Hundreds of hostages were rescued. But the gas attack is believed to have killed 118 of the civilians held inside the Moscow theater. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

In the Caucasus, two of the states in the region – Azerbaijan and Georgia – have played direct roles in the ongoing conflict in Chechnya. In the wake of the hostage crisis both countries have taken action to reduce tension with Russia over the Chechen issue. Yet, while Russia has thanked Azerbaijan for closing the Chechen cultural center in Baku [for background see the Eurasia Insight archive], Moscow continues to exert pressure on Georgia. Tbilisi’s continuing reluctance to follow through on a promise to extradite suspected Chechen terrorists has Russian officials particularly irate. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

A Russian foreign ministry spokesman accused Georgia of “double standards” in renewing Moscow’s demand for the immediate turn-over of the Chechens in Georgian custody. “Under current conditions, this [the extradition] is especially important,” the Itar-Tass news agency quoted the ministry spokesman, Alexander Yakovenko, as saying October 29.

Though not directly involved with the conflict in Chechnya, the Moscow crisis has placed Armenian leaders on guard. A commentary published by the Mediamax news agency October 28 pointed out that an increase in instability in other areas of the Caucasus could potentially help re-ignite the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. Already, the idea of again resorting to arms to settle the Karabakh issue appears to be gaining public support in Azerbaijan. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

“If the war in Nagorno-Karabakh resumes, can it be assumed that Chechen volunteers will express their willingness to participate in it [on Muslim Azerbaijan’s side against Christian Armenia]?” the commentary asked.

“Armenia, for a whole number of reasons, will never become a ‘nest’ for international terrorists,” the commentary continued, apparently referring to Georgia, which has been described by Russian officials as a terrorist haven. “That is why we shouldn’t rule out the possibility that international terrorism will sooner or later decide to ‘punish’ Armenia.”

Among Central Asian states the Moscow crisis has refocused official attention on Islamic radicalism. The US-led campaign against terrorism had dealt a considerable blow to insurgents belonging to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which had allied itself with Afghanistan’s radical Taliban movement.

Over the past week, Central Asian leaders have convened security council meetings to develop fresh strategies to counter Islamic radicalism. In Uzbekistan, for example, authorities intend not only to step up security measures, but also intensify propaganda efforts. An Uzbek Security Council meeting October 24, convened while Chechens still held hostages in Moscow, “stressed the importance of conducting explanatory work among the population, [and] noted the need for people to stay alert and take an active stance in safeguarding public order,” Uzbek television reported.

Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev likewise issued fresh instructions to law-enforcement officials October 29. “Our people should be very vigilant and keep an eye out for everything,” Khabar television said in a commentary.

Central Asian security officials prior to the Moscow crisis had warned that the IMU was regrouping and working to forge an effective insurgent confederation with other radical groups operating across Central Asia [for background see the Eurasia Insight archive].

However, several Kyrgyz analysts expressed concern that other groups – in particular, the Hizb-ut-Tahrir – may pose an even greater, and more immediate security threat to Central Asian states. An analysis published by the Vecherny Bishkek web site said the IMU’s military defeat during the US anti-terrorism blitz in Afghanistan did not crush the Islamic radical threat in Central Asia. “The beaten [IMU] militants crawled away,” the Vecherny Bishkek commentary said, “but the main thing is that their ‘Fifth Column' – the religious-political party Hizb-ut-Tahrir – is still in our rear.”

The commentary portrayed the radical movement, which advocates the overthrow of regional governments and the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, as “an octopus” that has “spread its tentacles throughout Kyrgyzstan.”

Hizb activists have become much more adept at printing and distributing leaflets and other propaganda materials, and in some areas of southern Kyrgyzstan up to 30 percent of inhabitants supported the radical movement, the article said. Overall Hizb membership in Kyrgyzstan is estimated at between 2,000 and 10,000, Vecherny Bishkek added.

“Hizb-ut-Tahrir has ceased to be an exotic eccentricity,” Vecherny Bishkek said.

Meanwhile, the newspaper Slovo Kyrgyzstana in an editorial called on authorities to develop “a consistent religious policy” that allows the state to “determine its attitude towards the threats of terrorism.”

“We shall then avoid extremes and erroneous judgements and shall not all the time be relying on ‘good old Uncle Sam,’” Slovo Kyrgyzstana said.

The newspaper also cautioned that other radical groups, including the Uighur nationalist East Turkestan Liberation Organization, could become increasingly problematic for Central Asian states. “Despite the difficult situation, the state is still engaged in lengthy deliberations and makes no adequate response,” the newspaper complained.

© Eurasianet