NPT Review Faces Challenges as Iran Knocks on Door

WASHINGTON: When the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was opened for signing in 1968, there were five recognized nuclear-weapons states. Today nine countries are known or believed to have the bomb.  When more than 185 countries gather at the United Nations this month to review the treaty, much attention will be focused on the challenge posed by a 10^th country – Iran, a party to the NPT accused by the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of violating its nonproliferation obligations. Certainly a key objective of the Obama administration will be to use the event to build pressure on Iran to restrain its nuclear program. The meeting also has the task of reenergizing the treaty, along with efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.

The conference, which convenes every five years, lacks the authority to penalize Iran, so the effort will concentrate on having the body issue a declaration that implicitly rebukes Tehran for secretly developing nuclear facilities capable of making bomb-grade nuclear material. Most likely, Washington will seek a declaration stressing the importance of the NPT in slowing proliferation and calling on all states to comply fully with its provisions. 

Since the conference operates by consensus and Iran will be present and could veto any declaration it finds unpalatable, Washington may not get the outcome it wants. But in this case, the medium may be the message: The process of working to achieve consensus, as it brings more states on board, will isolate Iran, especially if Tehran leads a group that blocks agreement on a final declaration calling for treaty compliance. Notably, the isolation strategy will reinforce simultaneous US efforts at the UN Security Council to impose additional sanctions on Tehran for its dangerous nuclear activities. 

Agreement at the May meeting will not come easily, however, because controversy has continued over the three key issues that divided the 2005 conference: the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, lack of progress towards establishment of a nuclear-weapon–free zone in the Middle East and restrictions on the right of all states to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The 118 states of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), acting as a bloc, have been the principal champions of the first and third of these, while Egypt has been the lead advocate for the Middle East nuclear-weapon–free zone. Egypt, heading NAM this year, will play a crucial role at the review conference.

Although the NPT does not require its “Nuclear Weapon State” parties – namely, the US, Russia, the UK, France, and China – to eliminate their nuclear arms, Article VI of the treaty does require all parties to “pursue negotiations in good faith” on measures relating to nuclear disarmament. President Barack Obama, beginning with his April 2009 speech in Prague, has embraced the objective of eventually eliminating all nuclear arms, although he has also stressed that as long as others possess them, the US will retain a robust nuclear deterrent. The US can also emphasize the recently signed US-Russia New START treaty, which will eventually reduce deployed nuclear weapons on each side to roughly 20 percent of those deployed at the height of the Cold War.

In the recently released US Nuclear Posture Review, moreover, the US declares that nuclear weapons would play a less salient role than in the past in national security and that their “fundamental” purpose would be to deter the use of nuclear arms by others against the US and its allies. That document also declares that the US would not use nuclear arms against any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT that is “in compliance” with its “nonproliferation obligations.” Such a firm “negative security assurance” has long been sought by NPT non-nuclear weapon states, although the new policy excludes noncompliant states, such as Iran and North Korea.

Obama has also made a commitment to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. But Senate Republicans have strong objections, and Obama will need at least eight Republican votes to succeed, a daunting challenge given Washington’s intense partisanship.

Despite such progress on disarmament, NAM can be expected to demand more, since nuclear weapons continue to serve as instruments of military might. Difficult negotiations on this issue lie ahead. 

The same holds true for the Middle East nuclear-weapon–free zone. Part of the bargain that was struck when the NPT was indefinitely extended in 1995 was adoption of the “Middle East Resolution,” which committed the parties to take practical steps in the future to make the zone a reality. Given that Israel, believed to have a nuclear arsenal of 100 to 200 weapons, has declared that it will not join such a zone until there is comprehensive peace in the Middle East – and the fact that Iran may soon become the region’s second nuclear power – realization of the zone is not a near-term prospect and, indeed, little progress has been made on the matter. Nonetheless, Egypt has made advancing the zone a major diplomatic issue. 

In the past, Egypt has often accepted a declaration brokered by the US reaffirming the need for the zone without calling for concrete actions. This time, however, Egypt demands more. Ideas discussed include the appointment of a UN “shepherd” who would visit regional states to identify outstanding issues pertaining to establishment of the zone or a regional conference on the subject. Conceivably in the course of negotiations, Washington might obtain language pressing states in the region to comply with their nonproliferation undertakings and relevant UN Security Council resolutions, thereby implicitly referring to the council’s demand that Iran cease its sensitive nuclear activities.

The third main area of controversy, a state’s inalienable right to enjoy peaceful uses of nuclear technology, as specified in Article IV of the treaty, also involves Iran, which claims that its previously secret uranium-enrichment program is protected by this provision. Many other NAM states, however, are angered by restrictions that nuclear-supplier states have placed on transferring nuclear technologies, in particular those for uranium enrichment and for separating plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. Both activities, although allowed under the NPT provision for peaceful use, can enable states to produce weapon-grade nuclear materials. Washington stresses that Article IV also declares that the right of access to nuclear technology must be consistent with the treaty’s nonproliferation purposes and that Iran’s behavior does not meet this standard.

Finally, lurking in the background is the US-India nuclear deal, which ended an embargo on nuclear trade with India, an acknowledged possessor of nuclear arms. The embargo had been imposed because of India’s refusal to place all of its nuclear activities under IAEA inspection. Although several NAM states, including South Africa, supported the deal, many other NPT non-nuclear weapon states blame Washington for easing pressure on India to accept the same restrictions they have implemented.

The NPT is a crucial tool for curbing the growing nuclear ambitions of aggressive states in volatile regions of the world. These dangers can only worsen if NPT parties cannot find compromises on long contentious issues and reinforce the treaty with a strong endorsement of its importance to international security.