Pressuring Tehran

Iran has come under increasing pressure since Washington officially ended its war in Iraq and turned its eye on other countries in the region. Now, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN's nuclear monitoring body, has passed a resolution giving Iran until October to declare the extent of its nuclear program and sign the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The resolution also directs the country to stop all enrichment of uranium, which can be used to produce nuclear weapons. Iran now has two choices: it can sacrifice some national sovereignty and acquiesce to the demands of the international community, or it can withdraw from the IAEA and face even harsher punitive measures. While many Iranian reformists and conservatives declare themselves ready to sign the NPT protocol, they fear that the US may be laying the groundwork to force regime change in Tehran. -YaleGlobal

Pressuring Tehran

Iran's failure to comply with the UN deadline may pave the way to imposing international sanctions, argues Mustafa El-Labbad
Mustafa El-Labbad
Friday, September 19, 2003

The governing board of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded a five-day meeting by passing a resolution calling on Iran to sign the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In addition, Iran is expected to answer a range of questions concerning its nuclear programme as well as halt all activities involving the enriching of uranium. The resolution gives the country until the end of October to comply.

The IAEA decision marks a qualitative shift in the escalating international campaign against Iran, which has picked up in momentum since the US occupation of Iraq and Tehran's subsequent entry into Washington's crosshairs. Should Tehran now fail to comply with the IAEA ultimatum, it will open itself to possible international sanctions. In November, IAEA Director-General Mohamed Al-Baradei is expected to submit a final report on the Iranian nuclear programme. If he declares that Iran had violated its commitments under the NPT, the case will most probably be handed over to the Security Council.

Unlike Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Iran is not currently subject to international measures encroaching on its national sovereignty. The fact that Iraq was subject to international sanctions merely facilitated Washington's task of making a case for a military offensive against that country on the grounds that it was in breach of the sanctions. So far, this situation has not applied to Iran which under international law enjoys full sovereign rights over every inch of its territory and international recognition of its government. To place the Iranian nuclear programme under Security Council scrutiny, however, is to alter Iran's status from a fully autonomous state to a state subject to externally imposed disciplinary measures and conditions, which, in turn, threaten to drag the country into the whirlpool of mounting technical, security and political demands.

The IAEA resolution received majority support from the agency's 35 members. It is particularly noteworthy that those in favour included Germany, France and Russia, which would seem to obviate a strong opposition block to possible sanctions as was the case with Iraq. Perhaps the clearest indication of the impact of the resolution on Tehran and Washington resides in the reaction of their respective delegates to the IAEA. Whereas Tehran's delegate, Ali Akbar Salehi, withdrew from the chamber as a gesture of protest against the draft resolution, Washington's delegate, Kenneth Brill, hailed the draft resolution as a symbol of the cooperation between the agency's member nations.

The IAEA resolution came on top of the inspection by an IAEA team of the Natanz electricity-generating plant, located 300 kms south of Tehran. From their tests on samples, the inspectors declared that there was evidence of the use of enriched uranium. Tehran denied the charge, claiming that the equipment from which the team had taken its samples had been purchased abroad and had been contaminated before reaching Iran. Iranian officials further stressed that the plant had no purpose other than to generate electricity. Such arguments, regardless of their veracity, are indicative of the extent to which Tehran has been placed on the defensive. This is also evident in Tehran's mishandling of the inspections process over the past few months, particularly in its tendency to focus on the technical aspects of the inspections (conditions, the timing of the visits and the duration of the inspections) to the virtual exclusion of the abundantly obvious political dimension of the process. It is because of this dimension that Iran's arguments, however cogent, are of little avail.

Tehran has countered that the US, which spearheaded the IAEA resolution, has not signed the additional protocol. It has further argued that it is Israel's nuclear capabilities, not Iran's, that pose the major threat to regional peace and security. Such arguments are powerless because the international situation today is such that no state or group of states is permitted to challenge Washington's will. Furthermore, "right" and "law" are not synonymous in the current arena of international power politics.

Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who is a central figure in the Iranian regime as head of the Expediency Council, put his government's predicament in a nutshell: "We reject the ultimatum." The statement implicitly underscores the stark choice Tehran has to make between two bitter alternatives. Either it can acquiesce unconditionally to an inspections process and a new onslaught of demands, or it can withdraw from the IAEA and refuse to deal with its representatives and inspectors. The first alternative would mean sacrificing a significant element of national sovereignty, while the second is certain to bring about international punitive measures.

The dilemma is reflected in the reactions of Iranian political factions. The conservatives, headed by religious officials in Qom, have issued a new and surprising fatwa, declaring that "Nuclear weapons are un-Islamic because they are inhumane." The ruling paves the way for the government to sign the additional protocol should it so decide. But the conservatives also condemned the ultimatum through the sermon delivered by Rafsanjani in last Friday's prayers at Tehran University Mosque. Meanwhile, the reformists seemed equally at odds with themselves. Although they openly declared that the government should sign the additional protocol, they lashed out at US policy towards Iran. Both the conservatives and reformists are acutely aware that the IAEA resolution has profound implications with regard to their country's geo-political aspirations. Regardless of whether or not Iran possesses a nuclear programme, such a programme would fall under its long-term drive to sustain its regional status and safeguard its geo- strategic advantages, especially with respect to India, Pakistan and Israel, the other three nations in the region with nuclear capabilities.

Iranians are further aware that the IAEA resolution has brought their country a step closer to Washington's objective to effect a regime change in Tehran as part of its ultimate designs for reshaping the regional geo-political map. The Security Council is not the only avenue Washington is pursuing towards the realisation of its goals. It is well-known that the Pentagon favours supporting and arming the Iranian opposition Mujahidin Khalq, and according to recent news reports, has already held secret talks with leaders of this organisation despite the fact that the State Department has included it on its list of terrorist organisations. Washington is also using the Internet in its campaign against Tehran. The San Diego-based company Anonymizer.com has been hired by the White House to breach Iranian censorship controls on Internet communications. The purpose is to bombard the Iranian public with a daily barrage of e-mail messages hostile to the regime in Tehran.

Copyright Al-Ahram Weekly. Reprinted from Al-Ahram Weekly Online: 18 - 24 September 2003 (Issue No. 656).