Russia Joins the US in Tackling North Korean Challenge

MOSCOW: Following his meeting in St Petersburg with Russian president Vladimir Putin, US president George W. Bush said "The United States and Russia are determined to meet the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction." Bush said they "strongly urge North Korea to visibly, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantle its nuclear weapons program." With such a strong and unequivocal statement, Russia has come a long way from its cautious position on North Korea, but achieving this goal peacefully will challenge the diplomatic skill of concerned countries.

Russia, which has had a substantive association with Pyongyang since the Korean War, is gravely concerned about the danger posed by the recent nuclear crisis. With its influence on North Korea dwindling - along with its assistance to North Korea - Russia nevertheless still has some leverage over the country because of their economic and military ties and Russia's position as a member of the UN Security Council. In dealing with North Korea's nuclear intransigence, Russia would prefer to prevent any unilateral American move and so finds itself on the side of South Korea, Japan and China. Putin clearly hopes to achieve that by joining Bush in issuing a strong statement.

Pyongyang's announcement of its wish to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty came as a surprise for Moscow. The official statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry issued on January 10, 2003 expressed deep concern. Moscow worried that North Korea's move would "exacerbate the already tense situation around the Korean Peninsula" and called on Pyongyang to "listen to the unanimous opinion of the world" and enter into "an equal and mutually beneficial dialogue with all the concerned parties." ¹

Korea was an important field of Russia's international strategy, both before and during the Soviet period. In the first half of the 1990s, a relative loss of interest towards the Far East and Asia in general - caused by the one-sided pro-Western orientation of the Kremlin - gradually gave way to a more balanced approach. This change naturally influenced Moscow's Korea policy. In May 2000 President Vladimir Putin stated: "Historically and geopolitically the Korean peninsular has always been within the sphere of Russia's national interests." ² The sentiment was echoed by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, who earlier this year wrote that "Russian policy towards the Korean peninsular is based on the necessity to maintain relations of good neighborhood and partnership with both Korean states." ³

Russia's pragmatic policy towards both Koreas is determined by several general factors. First, few in the Kremlin doubt that the North Korean regime is historically doomed. It may take five, ten or fifteen years, but it will disappear sooner or later from the world political map, and a new and united Korea will emerge as Russia's neighbor. South Korea, a country much more populous and developed than North Korea will surely be its core.

However, it is important both for Koreans and their neighbors when and how the reunification occurs. No one wishes the North Korean regime, which has stockpiled a lot of advanced weapons, to collapse abruptly with its hungry population seeking refuge in neighboring countries. Russia would prefer a gradual transformation of the North Korea regime leading to a step-by-step reunification. The Hungarian or Chinese model of transition would be much more preferable in Korea than the violent Romanian model. And in this field Moscow's interests coincide with those of Beijing and Seoul, which are also interested in North Korea as an effective economic partner. At present, both North Korea and South Korea are Russia's economic partners, and Russia has ongoing projects on the peninsula, including an ambitious plan to build a trans-Korean railway. Economic growth and cooperation - not conflict - is what Moscow wants.

The Russian approach to the crisis over North Korean WMD should be seen against this general background. At present the official Russian position is that Russia has no evidence that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons. However, North Korean announcement of its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, refusal to cooperate with the IAEA, reactivating of its nuclear program and admission of possessing nuclear weapons caused worries and led to condemnation from Moscow. Russia is very serious in cooperating with other countries on the nonproliferation system. But Moscow also believes that Washington should take its share of responsibility for the failure of the 1994 deal with Pyongyang and strive to reach a compromise with North Korea.

How specifically to proceed with settling the nuclear weapons problem in Korea and how to settle the current situation there really does matter to Russia. Earlier this spring, Russia put forth its own "package deal" for resolving the problems on the Korean peninsula. Similar to the South Korean 'roadmap' that eventually gained Moscow's support, Russia's plan called for multilateral discussions aimed at resolving the WMD problem in a way that addressed Pyongyang's security concerns and its energy worries. But, as with South Korea's plan, North Korean wasn't interested in Moscow's proposal.

North Korea's insistence on dealing only with Washington on the issue seems unreasonable to Moscow, since any American security guarantees to Pyongyang could hardly be of great value. It is currently widely recognized that China, and to a lesser extent Russia, are the countries which can press North Korea to fulfill any agreement reached with the United States. But China and Russia are also the only countries that can give Pyongyang formidable security guarantees against the US. Sharing a border with North Korea, Russia and China could effectively prevent a US military action in North Korea if they think it is unreasonable and too dangerous.

According to Russian officials, Russia has never assisted North Korea with its nuclear program. Other reports claim that in the 1950s North Korean scientists studied nuclear physics at the main Russian nuclear research center in Dunbar. In 1993, when Pyongyang for the first time announced its wish to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Russia even suspended cooperation on peaceful use of atomic energy. However, Moscow has never announced its wish to cut cooperation on conventional weapons. The North Korean army is equipped with Soviet produced weapons or their locally-produced modifications. Most of them are rather outdated and Pyongyang has expressed interest in buying new models of Russian tanks and airplanes.

Russian-North Korean military cooperation had continued until recently. In April 2001 an intergovernmental treaty on military cooperation was signed during the North Korean defense minister's visit to Moscow. According to Moscow, this cooperation meets only North Korea's legitimate defense needs. There were reports of North Korean plans to purchase an S-300 antiaircraft system, which is widely regarded to be very effective. The continuation or resumption of this cooperation, as well as Moscow's position on allowing a discussion of North-Korean WMD issue by the UN Security Council, can be a means of Moscow's influence on Pyongyang.

In general, Russia is willing to cooperate with the international community on the North Korean nuclear issue to achieve a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Moscow is ready to use whatever influence it can to persuade Pyongyang to renounce its nuclear weapons programs. While standing by Bush in issuing a strong statement, Moscow will more closely coordinate its policy with Seoul and Beijing where Russian concernes are shared and much better understood.

1 Quoted from this website: http://www.ln.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/.

2 Vladimir Putin, Vystuplenie na tseremonii vrucheniya veritel'nykh gramot (Speach at the Ceremony of Delivery of Credentials) http://194.226.80.159/events/33.html

3 Igor Ivanov, Novaya rossiyskaya diplomatiya. Desyat' let vneshney politiki strany (The New Russian Diplomacy: Ten Years of the Country's Foreign Policy)., (Moscow: Olma-press, 2001, p.158.