Schröder Boosts Arms Sales to China

Chancellor Gerhard Schröder is a man of action. And when the Social Democrat ventures out into the world, his actions have a way of focusing on economic deals instead of "classic" foreign-policy issues.

There is nothing unusual about this pecking order of priorities. All German governments have followed this principle. But there is one major difference between the approach taken by Schröder and the one used by other German governments. And this difference is not exactly one that you would expect the head of a coalition formed by the Social Democrats and Greens to exploit: weapons.

The history of the coalition's policies governing arms sales has been characterized by shifts. In 1999, the two coalition partners squared off against each other after Germany's Security Council decided to allow Turkey to test Germany's Leopard battle tank. The Greens were unable to reverse this decision. But they were able to tighten overall export regulations in such a way that Turkey no longer thought it had a chance of obtaining tanks from Germany and pulled out of the proposed business deal.

That was just one of the disagreements that the individual coalition partners have on issues involving Turkey. The Social Democrats argue that Germany cannot deny weapons to any country that fulfills the conditions for joining the European Union. The Greens, however, refuse to accept this idea unless certain conditions are attached. As Angelika Beer, one leading member of the party, said in August 2001, any proposed arms sales to Turkey will be examined very closely based on the criterion of human rights. But as a result of Turkish statements that the situation in the country is constantly improving, the time may come soon when it will be only "the usual suspects" who express reservations about the issue of selling tanks, ships and other weapons systems to Ankara.

China, on the other hand, is not a domestic issue in Germany. In economic terms, the gigantic country fuels people's money-making fantasies. Schröder, in particular, is courting the Chinese intensely. And one part of his routine is his call for the European Union to drop the arms embargo it imposed on China after the government in Beijing crushed a student protest movement in 1989.

As a result, he has to put up with complaints from some members of the public. But he really does not have to pay any attention to these critics. After all, his statements really amount to a sort of free lunch because Schröder can only influence EU decisions, not direct them. At the same time, he is sticking closely to the principle that anything beneficial to Germany cannot be all bad.

The debate about China is being conducted in more abstract terms than the one about Turkey. Even if the embargo were lifted, no concrete delivery contracts presumably would have to be considered right away. As a result, one side emphasizes the expected economic "collateral gain" of such a decision, and the other (primarily the Greens) points to the deplorable human rights situation in China.

"Scientific" arguments do not carry a lot of weight in this debate. Supporters of arms sales to China argue that such deals would enable the Europeans to influence the Chinese because weapons supplies would create technological dependence. Indirectly, this argument points to one problem in dealing with the Chinese. The People's Republic does not primarily need weapons to defend its territory or fight terrorists within its borders. But it does not explicitly rule out the possibility of expansion, at least when the focus is on regions that apparently belong to China. This attitude applies in particular to Taiwan, whose government never gets tired of asserting that the mainland poses an immediate threat to the democratic island.

Beijing's level of tolerance in the Taiwan question is very low. The whole world knows this. But the general feeling is that the issue will not lead to war and that it is really up to Taiwan not to provoke its big brother. Who would want to blame the Chinese for concluding from this attitude that a military attack on Taiwan would set off an international firestorm of outrage, but that the world would soon calm down and get back to its lucrative business with China? Schröder then could say that he had always seen China's market potential and sized it up correctly.