Schröder’s Agenda

NATO, the victor of the Cold War, stands at a crossroads. Since the U.S. war against Iraq, Germany has come under fire for fueling the alliance's break-up into several factions. In a conversation with F.A.Z Weekly, the chairman of the Institute for Foreign and Security Policy in Düsseldorf, Dimitrios Argirakos, talks about the state of the alliance after its June summit in Istanbul and the logic behind Germany's stance.

Did the NATO alliance walk away from the meeting in Istanbul stronger or weaker?

The results looked good on paper. But in reality, NATO was buried on the Bosporus. All stakeholders realized that the only thing holding the alliance together was the memory of its former strength during the Cold War. Since then, the United States, Germany and France have gone their separate ways. The facts are forcing Britain to take sides. The military gap between the U.S. and the EU is too great to allow for any sort of cooperation. And when it comes to evaluating the world's most important political questions - the Iraq crisis, the fight against terrorism and securing resources and markets - the alliance has been breaking up into smaller and smaller factions. Afghanistan is a case in point: Despite urgent appeals from President [Hamid] Karzai, the 26 NATO members were unable to agree on whether and how to suppress the power of regional warlords to support the central government in Kabul. If you consider that NATO leaders have given up hope of installing security in the south and southeast of the country, you have to ask what continues to justify the deployment on the Hindukush.

Are relations between Germany and the United States back to normal?

Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's rejection of an unconditional partnership with Washington and the proclamation of a German way has often been called a political snapshot lacking any sort of strategy. He's been accused of dividing the EU and restricting Berlin's diplomatic influence to almost nothing. But there's a method to Schröder's foreign policy madness. His renewed closeness with Paris did not divide the continent. Instead, Europe's (founding) unit was reinstituted, the strong Franco-German connection.

The fact that the West was ripped out of its rusty joints is critical for Germany's influence in the developing new world order, which is multipolar. The core element is the primacy of unbridled national interests, not an international community under a clear blue UN flag. Schröder's doctrine reflects the insight that the hunger for markets has taken on a new quality since the 1980s, a quality that people try to understand using the term globalization. His new policy is the expression of a normalization process for unified Germany based on proven European policy successes.

Berlin and Paris are planning to set up bilateral air and naval forces. This doesn't oppose the EU unification process, even if London sees things differently. There very simply isn't a European military interest, at least not yet. What old Europe was incapable of doing in five decades, new Europe certainly won't do more quickly. Germany can't wait that long. Anyway, Washington has been telling its allies for years to modernize their war equipment. But no one mentioned where the money was supposed to come from. On the other hand, NATO was supposed to be the big winner. But there won't be a coexistence of ESVP and NATO. During the Iraq crisis, France and Germany realized that the United States uses the alliance as a tool to achieve its own national interests.

But the United States doesn't have to worry yet. As long as Britain continues to side with the Americans, Schröder won't be able to make Germany Europe's hegemonic power, a power that mediates the interests of the small member states with Poland and Italy against France and Britain. This is how Germany plans to secure its desperately needed export markets and access to natural resources.

Chirac openly criticized Bush and the Iraq war in Istanbul. Why was Schröder so quiet?

Germany's Iraq policy is motivated by economic and domestic policy interests, not pacifist ideals. During times of economic crisis, neither the government nor the opposition wants to cross swords with industry, which has been making the pilgrimage to Baghdad for quite some time. Siemens, Daimler Chrysler, Linde, Deutz and all the rest have been dependent on the outstretched hand of the British-American controlled Iraqi transition regime. Because products with the “Made in Germany“ label have a terrific image, business potential is enormous. That's why Schröder has been diplomatically reserved so as not to offend the transatlantic friend. But neither did he criticize the comments of his bosom buddy from Paris.