Shock and Awe and a Clash of Cultures

War in Iraq has captured the world's attention - and especially that of Europe and the US.

The conflict now unfolding around Basra, Nasiriya and Umm Qasr is the most intensely covered war in history. "Embedded" journalists are with coalition ground forces racing towards Baghdad and stationed on warships launching air and missile strikes from the sea. Television shows the unfolding events, live and round the clock.

Even so, the watching world sees only a narrow slice of the most complex, sweeping and ambitious military operation ever undertaken. And what it sees is not universally interpreted in the same way.

This is a very different war from any the US has fought before. It lacks a casus belli. There has been no Pearl Harbor, no unprovoked Nazi attack on Poland. Nor, for that matter, is there a "smoking gun". The aim is to depose Saddam Hussein and disarm him of his weapons of mass destruction, not necessarily to destroy the Iraqi army.

Moreover, the technology and philosophy for waging this war are radically different. Ten times the number of precision and smart weapons are available than in the first Gulf war in 1991. These weapons are far better. And the philosophy of targeting is different. Wholesale destruction has been replaced with highly selective, highly precise - yet massive and intense - attacks on vital nodes and targets across the width and breadth of Iraq.

As advertised by the Pentagon, the US strategy is called "shock and awe". The Ministry of Defence in London, with English understatement, prefers the softer-sounding "effects-based operations". But whatever the term, the method is the same and akin to karate: the application of decisive and intense levels of force at the minimum level possible to achieve maximum effect. All the elements of psychological and physical power are used to persuade, coerce or compel the adversary to carry out America's will.

For me, as co-chairman of the group and principal author of the book that first advanced the doctrine of shock and awe, this war has particular meaning. The underlying philosophy of the doctrine is to win decisively, rapidly and inexpensively in terms of human life and the ravages of war. However, in war there are no guarantees.

Both the US public and its government can see that the war is going exceedingly well so far. The Iraqi army and Mr Hussein's regime have been stunned and rocked by the terrifying array of US super-technology and weapons. Ground forces are driving towards Baghdad. Special Forces are believed to have seized critical airheads, bridges and other important objectives. The air war against Baghdad offers the most visible image of the way the war has been conducted.

America's view of the war is not universally shared abroad, however. Opponents of the war criticise its conduct, no matter how humanely the coalition undertakes it. To them, humane warfare is an oxymoron. Lives are lost and property is destroyed.

Indeed, the overwhelming strength of US arms and the relative absence of organised resistance are interpreted as the local tough beating up a defenceless and puny victim. The irony is that, on this reading, Mr Hussein and his thuggish regime emerge as victims not villains.

To anti-war campaigners, the phrase "shock and awe" therefore has become an object of derision and disgust, a rallying cry for criticism of America's "brutal and inhuman conduct".

With a reported 3,000 targets to destroy, the attacks are equated with the worst aerial bombing raids of the second world war and considered attempts to terrorise and kill innocent Iraqis. That nothing could be further from the truth in the minds of US war planners cuts no ice.

In short, a clash of cultures is occurring: near-euphoria in the US conflicts with the growing distrust abroad that suspects America's intention is to use overwhelming force promiscuously.

That clash can only worsen, no matter how quickly, decisively and inexpensively Iraq is relieved of Mr Hussein.

Should the war drag on and civilian casualties and damage mount, this collision will be greatly intensified.

But there is a more important issue at stake. Whether or not this war is won rapidly and with relatively low loss of life to all concerned, the aftermath is what will count. Few can doubt that the coalition will win the war. The peace that follows is less certain.

For the US, one conclusion is clear. It knows that once victory in Baghdad is secured, it must win the hearts and minds of ordinary Iraqis. But how to win that struggle has not yet been defined. And there is no parallel strategy to shock and awe for implementing the peace. Should the US attempt to "Americanise" Iraq, that will prove disastrous.

President George W. Bush has bet more than his presidency on this war. He has bet the nation. Even if shock and awe prevail and the victory is quick and cheap, that is only the first phase in a much longer campaign to bring justice and stability to a region infested with the most virulent forms of violence and hatred the world has known.