Stopping the Iranian Bomb – Part II

WASHINGTON: Twenty-five years ago this week, the Iranian hostage crisis ended, after having tormented the American psyche for 444 days. Today, a nuclear crisis swirls around Iran, pulling Europe, the United States, Russia, China, India and others into its vortex. This crisis will last longer than 444 days and is vastly more foreboding for the entire world. We must hope that the magnitude of the nuclear challenge will inspire all actors to think beyond the drama of any given moment and, instead, reconcile Iran with international society after 28 years of estrangement.

For reconciliation to occur, of course, Iranian and American leaders must overcome their tendency to be out of phase with each other. Whenever Iranian leaders have inclined toward pragmatism and deal-making, Americans have been ideologically resistant. When Americans have tried pragmatically to reach out, directly or indirectly, to Tehran, Iranian leaders have reacted with revolutionary disdain or, perhaps, fear. Now Iran treats European leaders the same way. This irreconcilability would be banal if its consequences were not potentially so tragic.

The latest turn of the cycle of irreconcilability began in August 2005 when Iranian leaders ended suspension of work related to producing nuclear fuel. Iran had implemented this suspension in 2003 and then again, after a renegotiation, in 2004, in order to persuade IAEA members not to report Iran’s case to the UN Security Council. In September, President Ahmadinejad came to New York for the UN Summit and surprised Kofi Annan and other leaders by delivering a vitriolic speech. In October Ahmadinejad further dashed international confidence by challenging Israel’s right to exist. In December Iran insulted Russia by at first ignoring and later slighting Moscow’s offer to bridge the nuclear positions of Iran and the international community by establishing an Iran-Russia joint venture to enrich uranium for Iran in Russia.

These Iranian steps followed a clear logic. “The Europeans are like barking dogs,” President Ahmadinejad purportedly was overheard to say during his visit to New York, “if you kick them they will run away.” Whether or not the president actually said this, Iran’s actions from August to January amounted to kicking the dog. And at first the strategy appeared strikingly successful. Berlin, London, Moscow, Paris, Washington and other capitals did not bite back.

Now something must be done. With Iran ending its suspension of fuel-cycle activities, and showing disdain for the rules of the international community, the matter belongs in the UN Security Council. But it would be premature to seek to impose sanctions on Iran, let alone talk of military enforcement.

Some critics of sending the Iran dossier to the UN Security Council fear that Iran will judge the measure so provocative that Tehran will kick IAEA inspectors out of the country and make an open dash for nuclear weapons. Others fear that the Security Council will be so weak, due to Chinese and Russian resistance to sanctions, that Iran will expose the international community’s bluff and merrily go about producing nuclear weapons.

Both criticisms miss vital points.

Now that Iran has broken its suspension, not sending it to the Security Council could guarantee that Iran will proceed to enrich uranium and, as a result, acquire the capability to make nuclear weapons. Referring Iran to the Council has risks, but they are less clear than the risks of doing nothing or striking militarily too soon.

If Iran reacted to a Security Council referral by expelling IAEA inspectors or otherwise breaking with its acknowledged nonproliferation obligations, the country would de facto admit that it seeks nuclear weapons and end the ambiguity that has kept many key states from cooperating with France, Germany, the United Kingdom and others who seek to reverse Tehran’s course. Such a break would compel Russia, for example, to break off nuclear cooperation with Iran, leaving the Bushehr reactor unfueled and other technical problems unsolved. The political will to sanction and isolate Iran would be easier to muster than it is now. With inspectors and international technical partners out of Iran, military targeting of known nuclear facilities would be easier.

Smart Iranian leaders know this. They are not going to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or take other steps that would mark their nuclear activities as a threat to international security. Hence the threat of breaking with the IAEA is either idle or self-defeating for Iran.

The concern that Russia or China would block sanctions in the UN assumes erroneously that sanctions will or should be sought at this time. In the coming days, European and US leaders should clarify, when Iran’s nuclear case is sent to the Security Council, that the Council’s demand on Iran be straightforward and non-punitive: Iran should resume suspension of activities related to producing fissile materials as long as the IAEA cannot resolve unanswered questions as to whether Iran’s nuclear activities are solely for peaceful purposes. To enable the IAEA to do its job, the Council should mandate, under Chapter VII, that Iran satisfy the IAEA’s call for improved and timely access to sites, individuals, and original files.

Recognizing Iran’s legitimate interests in peaceful nuclear energy, the Security Council should formally state the importance of establishing mechanisms to guarantee the uninterrupted international provision of nuclear fuel services to Iran as long as Iran eschews construction and operation of uranium enrichment and plutonium separation capabilities. The Council should invite Iran and a commission of industry and other experts under the aegis of the IAEA to explore modalities for the most reliable, cost-effective provision of international fuel services to countries that forego indigenous production of fuel.

It is difficult to see how Beijing or Moscow could veto such a patient, non-punitive, by-the-book resolution by the Security Council. Of course, critics will then say that such a resolution is toothless, once again missing the strategic logic.

The goal is to induce the Iranian public and a core group of leaders to end their country’s isolation and integrate into the international system, and to show that this will happen if Iran foregoes acquiring inherently dual-use nuclear capabilities and ceases supporting organizations that conduct terrorism. To achieve this, Iranians must see that the world is unusually united. A non-punitive Security Council resolution will carry this message better than a sanctions-heavy resolution, infeasible anyway, because Iran’s radicals would rally less resistance to an international community that is acting temperately. If Iran rejects the terms of even a temperate resolution, then China and Russia and other Security Council members would be more willing to ratchet up the pressure. And when the ratchet turns due to Iranian belligerence or unreasonableness, internationalists competing for power in Tehran would have a stronger basis for demanding changes in their government’s course.

No Western politician to date has begun to prepare his or her public for the potential burdens of a protracted sanction contest with Iran or a military clash Indeed, recent calls for sanctions by senators Hillary Clinton and Evan Bayh were callow, precisely because they ignored the implications behind such a demand. No leading Iranian politician has articulated how the aspirations of Iran’s youthful population will be met if their country is an international pariah. As Iran and the US remember from the 1979-80 period, severe crises impose heavy burdens on society. Unless leaders prepare their populations to bear these burdens, they should not make idle threats. Good leaders build partnerships; foolish leaders blunder into isolation.