Superpower in the South Pacific

CANBERRA: The latest Australian intervention in the Solomon Islands may not have made headlines in India, but it is making waves in the region. It underscores the reality that Australia is the super power in the South Pacific, not merely in terms of its economic and military capabilities but also has the political will to exercise power, pre-emptively if necessary.

To be sure, the despatch of 2000 Australian troops to the failing state of the Solomon Islands was based on an official invitation from the Government of the Islands and has been endorsed by its Parliament. It is also multilateral in the sense that other countries in the region such as New Zealand and Papua New Guinea are part of the interventionary force. But here there is no doubt in anyone's mind that the largest military action in the region since the Second World War is about the exercise of Australian muscle. It is also clear that Canberra is now locked into a long-term strategy of acting as a nanny for the island states of the South Pacific.

Australia has for long doled out large sums of economic assistance to the island states but has stayed out of their internal affairs. But as the post-colonial political structures in the micro states of the South Pacific begin to crumble amidst rampant corruption and internecine warfare, Australia now has no option but to guarantee the survival of these states and actively help in their nation-building.

Within Australia there is an awareness that its new interventionary approach should drift into a neo-colonial enterprise. But there is also the recognition that there is no one else to take charge of the endemic crisis that has enveloped the South Pacific. Failing and failed states become havens for international terrorist and criminal networks and could create first order threats.

Failing states could also lead to humanitarian and other crises, which ultimately Australia will have to take charge of. Pre-emptive action, therefore, it is being argued here, is absolutely essential.

Australia believes that it has the economic resources to manage its current involvement in East Timor, Solomon Islands as well as a few other crises. Australia's military forces are small, and there are calls for expanding the size of its Army to meet future peacekeeping and stabilisation operations in the neighbourhood.

Within the South Pacific, where the love-hate relationship with Canberra is intense, as well as in South East Asia, which has always been wary of Australia's strategic intentions, political resentment is bound to be natural.

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As India and Australia seek to build greater military and political cooperation, are there prospects for cooperation between the two in the South Pacific? Any such suggestion, however, surprises Australian interlocutors. Why would New Delhi be interested in the South Pacific? Or is it the concern for the plight of the Indian community in Fiji that draws New Delhi to the South Pacific?

A study here by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute on the intervention in the Solomon Islands suggests a number of potential partners for Canberra in the future security management in the South Pacific.

These include Britain, France, Japan and the European Union. But India is not listed as one of them, for New Delhi has long been out of the range of Australia's political radar. New Delhi certainly has a long-standing concern about protecting the political rights of the Indian community in Fiji.

At the same time, India has been frustrated by its inability to do very much in Fiji except leverage the Commonwealth into acting against the island state. Moreover, military intervention in Fiji has never been an option for India.

As a rising power in the Indian Ocean and with aspirations for a political role in South East Asia and beyond, India has a natural interest in the South Pacific. More fundamentally, India is also aware that State failure could become a political trend in much of the region.

With both India and Australia undertaking a large number of peacekeeping operations around the region, it makes eminent sense that the two nations begin substantive consultations on the new security challenges in the region and develop a habit of political cooperation to deal with them.

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While India's interest in the region has been episodic and largely driven by the political turmoil in Fiji, China has become an increasingly visible player in the South Pacific. Heads of government from the region are frequently entertained in Beijing and senior members of the Chinese leadership often show the flag in the South Pacific.

Small amounts of strategically-placed Chinese aid, with no strings attached, have begun to deliver rising levels of political influence for Beijing. While Canberra is closely monitoring Chinese activity here, the Government does not want to press panic buttons. There is an understanding that Beijing's activity here is partly driven by the need to prevent Taiwan from scoring diplomatic points by buying recognition from the island states of the South Pacific. Canberra is also confident that while Beijing's profile is rising in the island states, it is Australia that still calls the shots.