Tech That, And That

When Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stepped into the Oval Office to meet President George W. Bush this week, the tectonic plates that were set in motion by the momentous events of the early 1990s realigned in unprecedented ways. His arrival underscored that India's emergence as a strong and confident independent actor on the world stage is one of the most significant strategic developments of the last 100 years and rivals in importance the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of China.

History generally supports the notion that the democratic experience creates a special resonance amongst states that practise it. But we should be under no illusions that it is democracy that is driving these two powers together. It is the increasingly convergent interests of India and the US across a wide spectrum of issues that lie at the root of the new relationship. If partnership is to be constructed, in the short term, interests, not ideology, will be the bedrock on which it is built.

In many respects, Indians have defined their interests and expectations more sharply and they have indicated that they will judge the effectiveness, if not the longevity, of the growing accord with the US on the basis of concrete results. Thus, discussions in the White House centred mostly on India's big-ticket items: easing restrictions on technology transfer to India, especially those to strengthen its nuclear power industry; India's quest for a permanent seat in the unsc; greater Indian access to America's high-tech weaponry and the licences to build it in India; joint efforts to promote energy security; and the removal of remaining trade barriers and impediments to US investment in India.

Manmohan and Bush announced progress in virtually every area of bilateral concern, symbolised by jointly enshrining the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP). Even on Jammu and Kashmir, Bush went the extra distance by reaffirming that this issue is for India and Pakistan to solve, but that the US would "facilitate", if asked. This is anything but the "internationalisation" of the conflict Pakistan has long sought. The president made it clear that America will assist when India does the asking.

It's hard to imagine that India could have expected more from this visit, which should decisively shatter the patronising notion favoured by some sectors of the Indian press that Manmohan Singh is unwittingly attaching India to America's larger agenda in Asia which, they insist, is to "contain" China. China is a global economic power, so where's the containment? Both the Clinton and Bush administrations have sought to shape and manage China's explosive rise without confrontation, an objective most Indian leaders share. Others share it, too. Around China's periphery, planners speak hopefully that the US military presence in Asia will persist, that Japan will step up as a "normal nation" to play a more visible role in Asia, and that India will emerge as the southern anchor of the US-Japan relationship. No one advocates poking a stick at China, but all wish to be assured that they will be supported in making future choices that China might otherwise oppose with its burgeoning power. This is not an American agenda, but an Asian one.

The president's upbeat promise to look for ways to assist India's nuclear power industry, despite onerous US laws and international conventions, is welcome, because his commitment transcends the stultifying monopoly the professional non-proliferation lobby has over the issue. He seemed to be saying that America will now treat India as a responsible nuclear power. He's right. India needs to be engaged fully in the struggle against nuclear proliferation in Asia.

The signs are worrying. Iran and North Korea could end up as the thin end of a wedge that triggers widespread proliferation across Asia, from Turkey to Japan. A more highly proliferated Asia, with many more countries possessing a few nuclear bombs, will upset any hope of deterrence. Moreover, restoring deterrence in a world where nuclear arsenals are difficult to cap and where incentives are certain to increase for other actors to become nuclear-capable will be enormously difficult. This new nuclear environment will require different kinds of diplomacy, perhaps with states like India leading in places where western powers have little purchase, like in Iran. It will also require new military technologies and operations for detecting, tracking, and locating loose nuclear weapons and weapons materials, then for destroying, capturing, or confining them. No nation by itself can encompass these cascading, interactive challenges. And it is doubtful that existing non-proliferation regimes have either the concepts to imagine or the vocabulary to describe dilemmas like these. This awareness should be at the heart of future Indo-US cooperation, even if it means overturning conventions designed to address yesterday's concerns.

In one other respect, one hopes the talks in the White House went even further than they did. Asia currently has no security architecture of any depth, and none of its many multilateral organizations—like the ASEAN, SAARC or APEC—has real military capacity or even an inclination for robust strategic planning. Yet it has become clear that on a wide range of security issues—including energy security in the sea lanes, threats of widespread nuclear proliferation, environmental disasters, terrorism, piracy, and many more—that multilateral security cooperation is overdue. What better outcome from this momentous week than for India and the US to articulate the ideas that set in motion the building of a new Asian security organization.