Tehran Is Using Iraq to Steadily Penetrate the Arab World

Since 1958, Iranian-Iraqi relations have been marked by intense hostility. Even the American invasion of 2003 did not seem to change much, as the first Iraqi government to assume office after the ouster of Saddam Hussein branded Iran the number-one enemy of the country. Therefore, it came as a surprise when, in late July 2005, an extraordinarily large Iraqi delegation consisting of Prime Minister Ibrahim Jaafari and 10 of his Cabinet ministers visited Tehran and signed several unprecedented agreements covering security, energy, trade, transport and tourism.

This raised serious questions about Iranian-Iraqi relations: How can we explain this new intimacy? And what benefits does Iran expect to reap?

To answer the first question it is necessary to identify the chief driver in the relationship. That in turn requires viewing Iranian-Iraqi relations in their historical context. An examination of bilateral relations reveals that ideological compatibility, or a lack thereof, has been the decisive factor determining the character of relations. Whenever their state ideologies have been compatible, the two countries have had peaceful and amicable relations; conversely, when their state ideologies have clashed, enmity has ensued and bilateral ties have been defined by conflict. The term "ideology" here refers to the philosophy shaping the political elite's perception of internal threats and the pattern of external alliances.

The period between 1932 (when Iraq gained its independence) and 1958 (when King Faisal II was overthrown) was one of ideological congruence. Authoritarian and conservative monarchies ruled in both countries. Regionally, they worked together against radical Arab regimes. Internationally, both regimes were closely allied to the West. Hence, despite some territorial disputes, relations were good.

The 1958 coup in Iraq marked the beginning of ideological divergence, as the radical Arab nationalism of successive regimes in Baghdad, and the Persian nationalism of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi clashed. Regionally, republican Iraq viewed Israel as the enemy of the Arabs and sought to subvert conservative Arab states. This was unlike Iran, which maintained close ties to Israel and conservative Arab regimes. Internationally, Iran kept up its alliance with the West, while successive Iraqi governments sided with the Soviet Union. Relations deteriorated to the extent that in the early 1970s war seemed imminent.

The victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran in February 1979 only served to intensify ideological differences, as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's fundamentalist brand of Islam came into conflict with Iraq's secular Arab nationalism, resulting in an eight-year war that left close to 1 million dead and injured on both sides. Despite the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the resulting radical changes there, ideological differences between Iraq's first post-invasion government, headed by Iyad Allawi, and the Islamic regime in Tehran remained as intense as before.

However, the National Assembly elections held last January 31 produced a sea change in Baghdad. The winning coalition of Shiite groups, consisting chiefly of the Islamic Al-Daawa party and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), had very close ideological, political and military ties with the Iranian regime, which for close to a quarter of a century had provided them with a base to fight Saddam Hussein. A chief consequence of this ideological affinity was the wide-ranging agreements that the two sides signed in Tehran last month. These agreements heralded something far more important: the emergence in the Middle East of a new alliance between Tehran and Baghdad.

From Tehran's perspective, such an alliance presents myriad benefits. To start with, it could restore security to Iran's western borders, allowing Tehran to concentrate its military resources in the south where an American invasion might be launched. Further, it would deal a serious blow to Washington's strategy of containing Iran and place Iran in a stronger position in bargaining with the United States and the European Union over a variety of issues, including Iran's nuclear program. Similarly, it would tilt the balance of power in the Persian Gulf in favor of Iran as it unites the region's two strongest powers against Saudi Arabia and its partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Such an alliance would also help improve the position of Shiites in Sunni-dominated Arab countries such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, allowing them to press more effectively for their political rights. As in Iraq, any rise in the power of the Shiite community in other Persian Gulf states would translate into greater power and influence for Iran.

Moreover, a friendly Iraq would allow Iran to have a direct land link with Syria, its major regional ally, rather than sea and air links that are more susceptible to disruption in times of crisis. Iranian leaders believe that a friendly Iraq could join Iran, Syria and Lebanon in an alliance against Israel, enhancing the position of Iran's Arab partners vis-a-vis Israel.

At the same time, Iraq would also provide Iran with an excellent entry point to penetrate the Arab world. Iran has so far relied on Syria and Lebanon to enter into the Arab scene and to influence Arab politics, but these links have always been at the mercy of the Baath regime in Syria. Iran very much prefers to have direct links that are neither dependent on President Bashar Assad's regime nor constrained by Syrian interests.

For as long as Shiites play a dominant role in Iraqi politics, one should expect the nascent Iran-Iraq alliance to survive. Being fully aware of the immense value of this alliance, the Iranian authorities will do what they can to assist the Jaafari government and will help ensure that Shiites get a share of power commensurate with their majority status in Iraq.