Two Years on, ASEAN Breaks Terrorism’s Deadly Lock

HOW has the war against terrorism in South-east Asia fared in the two years since Sept 11, 2001, and how well have states in the region responded to the challenge?

There have been some significant gains. The toppling of the Taleban regime in Afghanistan was a clear plus. It meant radical groups could no longer send recruits for training in Afghanistan or use it as a sanctuary.

The arrests in Singapore and Malaysia since 2001 have crippled the Jemaah Islamiah (JI) and Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM) networks in the two countries. The remaining members are on the run, most having fled to other countries. Terrorist attacks in these two countries, especially on soft targets, can still happen, but it has become more difficult for the JI to mount them or use these countries for transit or as bases.

There has been a significant change in Indonesia's attitude. Before the Bali bombings on Oct 12, last year, Indonesia was in denial. Many Indonesians then saw the Sept 11 catastrophe as a largely American problem.

Even after Bali, the feeling persisted for a few weeks among the public that elements of the Indonesian military or the US Central Intelligence Agency could have been behind the attack.

Over time, however, well-publicised investigations into and confessions of JI perpetrators convinced Indonesians they had a genuine terrorist problem on their hands.

There have been dozens of terrorists arrested since then, including some connected with the JW Marriott Hotel bombing last month.

Thailand, on its part, has since May this year taken a more proactive stance to deal with terrorists on its soil. It has made a number of arrests, including that of JI operational leader Hambali.

INTENSIFIED COOPERATION

ANOTHER legacy of Sept 11 is that there has been intensified cooperation at bilateral, regional and international levels to fight terrorism.

This has included stepped-up intelligence exchanges at the bilateral as well as the Asean level. The Asean Ministerial Committee on Transnational Crime was a useful platform to share best practices in the fight against terrorism.

More international avenues of cooperation can be expected. International bodies like the United Nations Security Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and the Financial Action Task Force require countries to report regularly their progress in specific areas of the global anti-terror war.

Despite all these gains, much still needs to be done.

It is the political will and capacity of individual countries to act against terrorist cells within their own borders and establish and enforce the necessary laws and regulations that count most.

Exchange of intelligence makes little practical difference on the battlefield if it is not acted upon. Impressive multilateral workshops and training modules do not enhance the capacity of a country to fight terrorism if what is learnt is not translated into practical application.

Political will and capacities vary from country to country. Singapore and Malaysia can be said to have demonstrated unambiguously both the will and the capacity to fight terrorism. The picture in the other key countries is more mixed.

Indonesia is still reluctant to embark on a comprehensive crackdown on JI within its borders, preferring instead to act mostly against that part of the network responsible for the Bali bombings, and, presumably, the JW Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta.

The clandestine JI network in Indonesia is probably extensive, possibly with hundreds of members, and with links to other radical Muslim groups that operate openly. The recent arrests have probably only scratched the surface.

Indonesia has a considerable way to go to develop proper legal and judicial systems and build the capacity to act effectively on matters like border control and terrorist financing.

However, perhaps it is better to count the blessings than bemoan what has not been possible thus far.

It is not difficult to understand the Indonesian dilemma. In the democratic politics of the country, Islam is a significant political force.

This fact, together with the approach of elections next year, makes political leaders tread gingerly against JI so as not to invite a backlash from conservative Muslims.

Another country that is an important link in the terrorist network in South-east Asia is the Philippines. It was the first South-east Asian country into which Al-Qaeda moved to co-opt local Muslims struggling against the Manila government into its global jihad against the West.

Thus the Abu Sayyaf group (ASG) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have been linked with Al-Qaeda from the early and mid-1990s, and some South-east Asian JI operatives have been trained in MILF camps.

On the surface at least, the Philippines has the will to combat terrorism and a willingness to seek US assistance to fight the ASG. However, the anti-terrorism war is hampered by capacity shortcomings and lack of a coherent and effective strategy to deal with the MILF, the more formidable of the two main rebel groups.

Unless the MILF can be made to dissociate itself from JI and Al-Qaeda, the Philippines will remain a weak link in the war against terrorism, because MILF-controlled areas can provide sanctuary and training facilities for South-east Asian terrorist elements.

The problems for the Philippine government are compounded by weak governance, reported corruption in the military and factionalism in the MILF, with more radical elements wanting to keep up the armed struggle and links with foreign terrorist groups.

Thailand, too, has an important role to play in the regional war against terrorism.

This predominantly Buddhist land has been used by Al-Qaeda agents and JI terrorists not only for transit but also as a meeting place and hideout. Hambali, for instance, was hiding in Thailand when he was arrested last month.

Thailand's graduation since May, from denial to cautious acknowledgment of a terrorist problem, was followed by some arrests of JI suspects. Still, the country has been proceeding very cautiously, apparently so as not to scare off tourists or alienate the Muslim population in the south.

So some doubts remain whether Bangkok is fully on board for the drive against terrorism in South-east Asia.

INFILTRATION ELSEWHERE

JI HAS tried to infiltrate Muslim communities in other parts of the region, especially those that feel marginalised or persecuted, for instance the Cham Muslim community in Cambodia and the Rohingya community in Myanmar's western Rakhin state.

Hence the need for vigilance against a nimble adversary ever prepared to use any opportunity to advance its cause.

In conclusion, while terrorism in South-east Asia has suffered certain setbacks over the past two years, it remains a threat. Terrorists are unlikely to be able to overthrow or endanger the survival of any government, but they have the capacity to inflict serious economic harm by damaging investor sentiment and the tourism industry.

In general, socio-economic and institutional weaknesses in many parts of this region remain causes for concern, but their impact should not be exaggerated. Socio-economic distress and institutional shortcomings are often not causes of terrorism, but provide terrorists and radicals with exploitable issues.

Radical Islam in South-east Asia is an import from abroad. It still has little influence in the mainstream of South-east Asian societies. Without the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan and the essentially Arab-based Al-Qaeda, there would be no JI of the kind we know in South-east Asia.

So long as the terrorists have not acquired a critical mass and deep roots in mainstream local societies, they can be isolated and hunted down if countries of the region can marshal the will and capacity to take effective action.

Just as the JI has been shaped into what it is today by forces and events outside this region, so its future fortunes, for better or worse, are also likely to be affected by developments outside the region.

What happens to Al-Qaeda on the global stage and what happens to Islam in countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran will have an important bearing. Needless to say, so will the eventual outcome of the struggle now shaping up in Iraq, which is drawing radical groups from neighbouring countries, and its impact on US global policies and posture.

Asean countries are fighting terrorism not to please the Americans. They have powerful reasons of their own to do so. The radical agenda terrorist groups espouse and their violent methods are unacceptable not only to the governments but to the vast majority of the people of South-east Asia.