The U.S. and the End of WMD Regimes

As the US moves closer to its war with Iraq, it is becoming clear that the post-1945 nuclear non-proliferation regime along with the efforts to control other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are all becoming increasingly irrelevant as they become ensnarled in the political agenda of the US. For instance, by casting into doubt the ratification by certain states of treaties relating to WMD, the treaties themselves are being undermined in terms of credibility. Of course, for the US it is totally irrelevant if the state in question happens to be a party to the main non-nuclear proliferation and other anti-WMD treaties/conventions.

Presently, this is most glaring in the case of Iraq, but other states should also be feeling increasingly vulnerable on this count, For instance Iran is already being targeted for its nuclear power programme, especially its decision to acquire enrichment capability which would be subject to IAEA safeguards as per Iran's NPT commitments. Despite this, Iran is facing increasing suspicion and questioning of its nuclear intent. Strange why no one is questioning Japan's development of an extremely expansive nuclear programme, including fast breeder reactors, despite the fact that Japan could become a nuclear weapon power almost within the month if it chose to leave the NPT. After all, Iran and Japan are both full parties to the NPT. So what makes Iran suspect? Purely its adversarial relationship with the US!

In the same vein, ironically, states like Israel, which have not signed the Biological Weapons Convention and failed to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, are kept totally out of the purview of the WMD regimes. Also, the growing use of the issue of weapons of mass destruction/nuclear proliferation as a cover for enforcing regime change where governments do not fall into line with US policy imperatives is going to distort the nuclear non-proliferation and other WMD regimes increasingly over time. This problem will become even more acute as an attempt is made to bring in the issue of nuclear terrorism within the mainstream of the framework of WMD proliferation.

So, while WMD regimes are being sidelined and marginalised, as a result of the policies of the US and its allies, one cannot help but see ever more clearly the increasing vulnerability of states like Pakistan on these issues, in the face of a growing US military presence in the region as well as in Pakistan itself. The vulnerability arises because of the prevailing US agenda of pushing through its regional political agendas by the use of force, and by the exploitation of the issue of WMD in the pushing through of these agendas. With all the technical intrusive intelligence capabilities the US has, and with the US having a multiple level presence in this region not only in Pakistan but also in the Indian Ocean and in Afghanistan and Central Asia, the vulnerability of the strategic assets of the states of the region can become extremely acute once the US decides to undermine them. States like Pakistan do not have to give access -- force can be used and, unless the country is prepared for such worst case scenarios, our vulnerabilities will lie exposed. No matter what the level of our optimism and expectations in relation to the US, it would be foolhardy to assume that Iraq is the final end game for the US. And we do know this -- even at the level of civil society -- which is why very valid suspicions are aroused when tragic "accidents" happen in the form of crashes and blasts. After all, "friendly" or "unfriendly" fire is a real threat to our assets in sensitive areas where external actors are locked in an asymmetric military conflict. And this is a conflict which has dimensions that go beyond the local region.

And, to add to the level of the threat, already even as Iran's nuclear programme comes under fire, the US is undermining the nuclear stability and deterrence in South Asia. It is doing this by developing a strategic partnership with India, which includes supplying India with missile defence systems -- directly and through Israel -- which would compel Pakistan to move away from its policy of unilateral nuclear restraint. Then again, while Pakistan is accused, with no proof, but based on an American newspaper's conjecture, of aiding North Korea's nuclear development no mention is made of India's established WMD aid to Iraq and its other contraventions of its international obligations within the realm of WMD.

Yet, the list of India's contraventions is as long as it is old. For instance, it violated its agreement with Canada on the Trombay reactor -- which provided the fissile material for India's 1974 nuclear test. India also contravened its 1992 bilateral agreement with Pakistan on chemical weapons by continuing to sustain a clandestine chemical weapons programme. The revelations came only after India became a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention. And the list continues -- but did any international organisation or major power impose any sanctions on India for these contraventions, or even so much as reprimand it for its errant behaviour? Of course not! In fact, in 1974, after the Indian tests, it was Pakistan that faced the wrath of the international community! At a recent international conference, an American scholar based in Britain also accused Pakistan of aiding Iran's nuclear development, reflecting the new and rather unfortunate US trend of making Pakistan one of its favourite whipping boys on the nuclear issue.

To make matters worse, the US Nuclear Posture Review and National Security Strategy Paper -- both of 2002 -- deliberately seek to rationalise nuclear war fighting, as BMD had begun to do earlier. So, obviously, WMD regimes are going to become enmeshed into the political agendas of major powers like the US. As it is, international organisations dealing with these regimes are already on their way to becoming highly politicised so that we find the IAEA now expanding its agenda from one of focusing purely on safeguards and technical issues linked to them, to one where it is moving into the political arena of mainstream arms control and disarmament. In this regard, it is now looking at issues like nuclear terrorism and nuclear arms control and disarmament -- issues that are the purview of the UN's Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. But then the IAEA is a more attractive forum for the US because it does not work on the principle of equity in terms of members' representations and so on.

However, what this will lead to, in the long term, is a destruction of the credibility of a purely technical international organisation -- the IAEA -- which is what the US seems to be wanting with regard to international organisations generally, as can be seen with the manner in which the UNSC is being treated. Once these institutions have lost their credibility, the US will have far greater freedom of manoeuvre to implement its national global agendas. After all, unilateralism -- especially of the intrusive, interventionist kind -- can succeed more effectively if the credibility of international organisations and norms is destroyed. And it is clearly this new path that the only superpower has chosen to traverse. Within this new international milieu there is no room for consensual regimes and norms.