U.S.–China Ideological Rivalry Heats Up

WASHINGTON -- Two recent events in Asia have again directly underscored the "ideological" tussle between Washington and Beijing, which is increasingly seen as a benevolent power and even as offering a model for socioeconomic development. As Asian leaders gathered last month in Kuala Lumpur for the East Asian Summit, antiglobalization protests against the sixth World Trade Organization ministerial meeting gathered steam in Hong Kong.

At a recent conference on Asian economic integration held in New Delhi, a professor from Jawahral Nehru University spoke of a socially oriented "Beijing Consensus," contrasting it with the liberal "Washington Consensus" that emerged in the 1990s.

The professor reminded the audience that as Asian countries try to establish an East Asian Community, they must reflect on the type of society they really want to establish: a liberal Anglo-Saxon model or a more socialist model that places emphasis on stability before development and reforms.

In fact, China's political and economic presence and influence have become overwhelming, as Beijing has largely convinced its smaller Asian neighbors that it presents an opportunity rather than a threat, and a model for socioeconomic development.

One interesting difference between the two consensuses is that one emanated from Washington (although many Asians perceive it as having been "imposed" upon them), whereas the other emanated not from Beijing but from a Western academic/journalist, Joshua Cooper Ramo, in a book titled "Beijing Consensus: Notes on the New Physics of Chinese Power," published in 2004 by London's Foreign Policy Center.

The Washington Consensus emerged from the neoliberal revolution that swept the globe with the arrival of the Thatcherite and Reaganite schools of thought and power. It marked the beginning of the neoliberal Anglo-Saxon credo that formed the basis of the globalization wave, which in turn has laid the foundation of the present socioeconomic and political movement toward "free markets, free societies."

This movement has manifested itself in U.S. President George W. Bush's push for democracy and freedom in the Middle East, as well as in British Prime Minister Tony Blair's vision of a European Union that is based on economic competition, political democracy and social liberalism. This brand of Anglo-Saxon liberalism has since become synonymous with globalization.

China, on the other hand, has insisted on stability as the foundation of its foreign policy rather than political or social reforms. In fact, after seeing the chaos that ensued after the collapse of the Soviet Union (before Russian President Vladimir Putin restored some order), Chinese leaders came out more strongly in favor of growth-based "stability, development and reform" (in that order).

Two events this year emphasized this point. In Bratislava, Chinese leaders were delighted when Putin refused to back down after Bush chastised him for not respecting and promoting democratic development in Russia. Similarly, during Bush's last visit to Beijing, Chinese President Hu Jintao accommodated him on further Chinese economic and financial reforms, but refused to bend on political reforms, human rights or religious freedom.

Chinese leaders will continue their socioeconomic reforms, but are determined to develop "democracy with Chinese characteristics" without outside interference.

A dramatic increase in domestic unrest led Chinese leaders to decide at the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in October to strengthen measures to contain social frustrations.

According to a senior Chinese economist at Beijing University, China's private sector will be tasked with consolidating economic liberalization reforms (with support from financial authorities), while the public sector (state and local authorities) will spearhead social reforms to reduce "social frustrations, disparities and unrest." This "dual economy" should be incorporated into the 11th five-year plan, to be approved in March at the legislative session of the National People's Congress. It is clear that Chinese officials refuse to view political reforms as an antidote against social unrest in China.

Journalist Ramo says Beijing is introducing a "new physics of development and power," instead of relying (like the U.S.) on "traditional tools of power projection." He concludes that this new paradigm could "remake the whole landscape of international development, economics, society and by extension, politics."

In fact, Ramo projects that the Chinese could eventually "eclipse the U.S." by "constructing an environment that will make U.S. hegemonic action more difficult." Just as the Washington Consensus was the "hallmark of end-of-history arrogance," the "Beijing Consensus" is centered on developmental economics, social and economic changes, and thus "a shift from power politics to moral politics" that would probably turn "traditional ideas of privatization and free trade on their heads."

He also concludes that the Beijing Consensus should be more appealing to developing countries. Unlike its Washington counterpart, the Beijing Consensus "reflects the ancient Chinese philosophical outlook that makes little distinction between theory and practice" and is "flexible enough not to be classifiable as a doctrine." In short, it is more akin to Mao Zedong's edict of "groping stones to cross the river."

The ideological differences between Washington and Beijing could spark genuine competition between American and Chinese models of economic management and societal development. Although many observers say China doesn't have "real soft power" but instead is astutely "using its power softly," the stage is nevertheless set for a growing rivalry between the two giants.