US Election and the World – Part II

BEIRUT: George W. Bush's reelection coincides with several other developments that may redraw US policy in the Middle East. After having been rather static since the war on Iraq, the US-Mideast relationship seems likely to move into a more dynamic mode, given the changes and possible reassessments taking place. Yet the forces at play are pulling and pushing in different directions, leaving the net impact of the election outcome on the Middle East still a work in progress.

Four main, inter-linked issues define the American-Middle Eastern relationship: the situation in Iraq, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the "war on terror" and related attempts to stop proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the broad reform strategy for the region's political and economic systems. Leadership – in the Middle East, the US and Europe – will likely be the wild card that determines if Bush's second term policies help move the Middle East towards peace, stability, and prosperity, or towards more tensions and war.

Concern and even fear of more violent confrontations have been the predominant reactions to Bush's re-election throughout the Arab-Islamic Middle East, due to the strong confluence of domestic forces that secured the president's victory. The White House, Congress, the Republican Party, and much of the mass media are now firmly defined by an unprecedented coalition of mainstream conservatives, aggressive neo-conservatives,

traditional pro-Israeli groups, and Christian fundamentalist evangelicals. This coalition has largely driven the post-9/11 Bush foreign policy of pre-emptive war, regime change, and active war on terror, with the Middle East as both testing ground and crucible.

Analysts and ordinary citizens throughout the Middle East already express deep concern that Washington will continue the policies of the past three years, including active warfare in Iraq, redrawing the Middle East political map, defining relations through the lens of the "war on terror," pressuring and threatening regimes such as Syria and Iran, and siding largely with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon on basic Arab-Israeli issues.

Yet most people in the Middle East and Europe – and smaller numbers in the United States itself – sense that this combination of policies is not achieving the stated goals of a more stable, democratic, prosperous region. Iraq remains in the grip of a violent cycle of occupation and resistance, and has become a magnet for anti-American militants and terrorists. The threat and use of terror seems to have expanded in the past two years, as terror networks decentralize their operations, becoming less susceptible to police and military actions. Israel's iron fist strategy against the Palestinians has not brought the Israeli people either the peace or the security that Ariel Sharon promised.

Israelis also increasingly voice concerns about being subjected to international sanctions like those which pressured the South African Apartheid regime. Concerns are growing about the proliferation of WMDs, including this week's warning by the International Atomic Energy Agency about terrorists using radioactive materials in a future attack. The so-called US "coalition" in Iraq is steadily fraying, with Hungary the latest state to announce its post-January departure from Iraq.

America's foreign policy in the Middle East has generated a massive protest backlash across the entire globe – not just in the Middle East – with most critics pointing to Iraq and Palestine/Israel, along with Washington's aggressive diplomatic manner, as US foreign policy problems that must be addressed in a more coherent and integrated manner.

If the Bush administration dispassionately reassesses its ideology and policy in the Middle East, it might recognize some important points: It must reestablish American diplomatic credibility in the region; it can do this quickly by working vigorously for a fair, negotiated Arab-Israeli peace agreement that responds equally to Israeli, Palestinian, and other Arab rights; and it must aim to reduce the terror threat through political and economic policies defined jointly with the people and states of the Middle East – rather than primarily through military policies designed largely by pro-Israeli ideologues in Washington.

Several new factors suddenly provide the Bush administration with opportunities to rethink Middle East policies. Yasser Arafat's illness and the imminent transition to a new Palestinian leadership is one such factor, though it is naïve to assume that a post-Arafat leadership would give in meekly to most American and Israeli demands. The personalities will change in Palestine, and tactical approaches to peace-making will become more flexible, but the substantive policies of the Palestinians will not differ. A post-Arafat Palestinian transitional government is likely to achieve a cease-fire that allows diplomatic negotiations to resume, if Israel simultaneously reduces its military assaults and land grabs in Palestine.

The United States, Israel, and Arab states, notably Syria and Saudi Arabia, will need to move much more decisively in order to capitalize on any such diplomatic opportunity. This will need a more emphatic commitment to Israel's full evacuation of the Arab lands it occupied in 1967, in return for full peace from the Arabs, along with a reasonable, negotiated resolution of the Palestine refugee issue that respects all parties involved.

These are achievable goals, with Israeli and Palestinian public opinion majorities supporting them. The missing element has always been honest, decisive, dynamic leadership – in Palestine, Israel, the US, and the Arab states. If the US decides to resume its role as honest broker and fair mediator rather than Israel's strategic ally, and combines diplomatic and economic forces with Europe and the Arab states, a fast breakthrough for Arab-Israeli peace is possible within the coming year.

This way, the United States could manage its other concerns in the region more effectively, starting with Iraq, which is also an arena ripe for a change of policy. Movement towards ending the Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Arab lands, and resolving the Palestine refugee issue through statehood and other compensatory means, would quickly invigorate American credibility throughout the Middle East. Washington would then find itself more widely welcomed as a partner in working for stability and democracy in Iraq, and also for promoting political and economic reforms throughout the region.

In other words, Washington could redefine its presence in the Middle East in a way that would see it welcomed by the Arab-Islamic societies there. This would require a shift from unilateral militarism, preemptive war, and disproportionately pro-Israeli positions, towards a more even-handed policy anchored in UN resolutions and international law. There ought to be more explicit multilateral and consultative mechanisms that see the peoples of the region more as partners and less as potential targets. The neo-con ideologues in Washington will resist such a strategy. It remains unclear if a reassessment of the administration's current Mideast policies will continue this approach, or revise it substantially.

The quality of leadership in Israel and the Arab countries, and Europe to a lesser extent, will play a decisive role in any redefinition of US Mideast policy in the near future. Mideast leaders who legitimately reflect their public opinions and vigorously engage the Bush administration, with the aim of working to end occupations in the region, are likely to achieve historic and positive changes in the area. Leaders in Washington and the Middle East who persist in their traditional policies and approaches will only doom their people to decades more of increasingly violent confrontations and warfare.